Otto H Swank
Biographic Data
| ID | 5733265 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Otto H Swank |
| GIVEN NAMES | Otto H |
| FAMILY NAME | Swank |
| SIGNATURE | SWANK O H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Tinbergen Institute |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3968-0560 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Electoral Incentives to Obtain EU Grants
Political agency models predict that electoral concerns induce politicians to put effort into making policies that benefit citizens. We exploit the introduction of mayoral term limits in Portugal to investigate how electoral incentives affect incumbents’ efforts to obtain EU grants. We focus on EU grants because getting them requires effort. Moreover, by obtaining EU grants, mayors can do more for their citizens. We focus on Portugal because it p…
Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism and Popular Will
Populists are often anti-elitist and advocate for popular will over expertise. We show that these two populist characteristics are responses to mainstream parties leaving behind the majority of voters, the common people. Our model highlights two forces behind electoral success: numbers, which favor the common people, and knowledge, which favors the elite. Electoral competition may lead parties to cater to the elite. We identify conditions under w…
A social image theory of information acquisition, opinion formation, and voting
Recent empirical research on voter turnout has revealed a variety of regularities. Citizens who expect to be asked about their turnout decisions after the elections are more likely to vote. Parents whose children enter the electorate are more likely to vote when their children live home than when they left home. Citizens without social networks acquire less information about politics. We develop a model that can explain these and other empirical …
Labor Market Quotas When Promotions Are Signals
We analyze the consequences of labor market quotas for the wages of women in high-level positions. Labor market quotas create uncertainty about the reason a woman is promoted. Firms know whether they promoted female employees because of the quota or their ability; their competitors do not. A winner’s curse, reducing competition for women in high-level positions, results. This widens the gender pay gap for these women. Ex ante, women are better of…
A Simple Model of Self‐Assessment
We develop a simple model that describes individuals' self-assessments of their abilities. We assume that individuals learn about their abilities from appraisals of others and experience. Our model predicts that if communication is imperfect, then ("i") appraisals of others tend to be too positive and ("ii") overconfidence leading to too much activism is more likely than underconfidence leading to too much passivity. The predictions of our model …
Do elections lead to informed public decisions
Producing and Manipulating Information
To reduce the chances of policy failures, policy makers need information about the effects of policies. Sometimes, policy makers can rely on agents who already possess the information. Often, the information has yet to be produced. This raises two problems. First, for a policy maker it is hard to ascertain how much effort an expert has put in acquiring information. Second, when the expert has an interest in the policy outcome, she may manipulate …
Budgetary Devices for Curbing Spending Prone Ministers and Bureaucrats
Economic Outcomes and Voting Behaviour in a Multi-Party System: An Application to the Netherlands
Learning and signalling by advisor selection
Government spending cycles: Ideological or opportunistic
Partisan views on the economy
Popularity functions based on the partisan theory
Popularity functions based on the partisan theory
Government spending cycles: Ideological or opportunistic
Producing and Manipulating Information
To reduce the chances of policy failures, policy makers need information about the effects of policies. Sometimes, policy makers can rely on agents who already possess the information. Often, the information has yet to be produced. This raises two problems. First, for a policy maker it is hard to ascertain how much effort an expert has put in acquiring information. Second, when the expert has an interest in the policy outcome, she may manipulate …
Economic Outcomes and Voting Behaviour in a Multi-Party System: An Application to the Netherlands
Learning and signalling by advisor selection
Partisan views on the economy
Budgetary Devices for Curbing Spending Prone Ministers and Bureaucrats
Popularity functions based on the partisan theory
Partisan views on the economy
Government spending cycles: Ideological or opportunistic
Learning and signalling by advisor selection
Economic Outcomes and Voting Behaviour in a Multi-Party System: An Application to the Netherlands
Budgetary Devices for Curbing Spending Prone Ministers and Bureaucrats
Producing and Manipulating Information
To reduce the chances of policy failures, policy makers need information about the effects of policies. Sometimes, policy makers can rely on agents who already possess the information. Often, the information has yet to be produced. This raises two problems. First, for a policy maker it is hard to ascertain how much effort an expert has put in acquiring information. Second, when the expert has an interest in the policy outcome, she may manipulate …
Do elections lead to informed public decisions
A Simple Model of Self‐Assessment
We develop a simple model that describes individuals' self-assessments of their abilities. We assume that individuals learn about their abilities from appraisals of others and experience. Our model predicts that if communication is imperfect, then ("i") appraisals of others tend to be too positive and ("ii") overconfidence leading to too much activism is more likely than underconfidence leading to too much passivity. The predictions of our model …
Labor Market Quotas When Promotions Are Signals
We analyze the consequences of labor market quotas for the wages of women in high-level positions. Labor market quotas create uncertainty about the reason a woman is promoted. Firms know whether they promoted female employees because of the quota or their ability; their competitors do not. A winner’s curse, reducing competition for women in high-level positions, results. This widens the gender pay gap for these women. Ex ante, women are better of…
A social image theory of information acquisition, opinion formation, and voting
Recent empirical research on voter turnout has revealed a variety of regularities. Citizens who expect to be asked about their turnout decisions after the elections are more likely to vote. Parents whose children enter the electorate are more likely to vote when their children live home than when they left home. Citizens without social networks acquire less information about politics. We develop a model that can explain these and other empirical …
Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism and Popular Will
Populists are often anti-elitist and advocate for popular will over expertise. We show that these two populist characteristics are responses to mainstream parties leaving behind the majority of voters, the common people. Our model highlights two forces behind electoral success: numbers, which favor the common people, and knowledge, which favors the elite. Electoral competition may lead parties to cater to the elite. We identify conditions under w…
Electoral Incentives to Obtain EU Grants
Political agency models predict that electoral concerns induce politicians to put effort into making policies that benefit citizens. We exploit the introduction of mayoral term limits in Portugal to investigate how electoral incentives affect incumbents’ efforts to obtain EU grants. We focus on EU grants because getting them requires effort. Moreover, by obtaining EU grants, mayors can do more for their citizens. We focus on Portugal because it p…
Economics (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Law (8 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Public finance (7 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Macroeconomics (5 works)