Producing and Manipulating Information
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9713952 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Dur (0000-0001-9081-4179, Erasmus University Rotterdam), Otto H Swank (0000-0003-3968-0560, Tinbergen Institute) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 115 |
| Issue | 500 |
| Pages | 185-199 |
| Publication date | 2005-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00965.x |
| OpenAlex | W3124309398 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 12 |
To reduce the chances of policy failures, policy makers need information about the effects of policies. Sometimes, policy makers can rely on agents who already possess the information. Often, the information has yet to be produced. This raises two problems. First, for a policy maker it is hard to ascertain how much effort an expert has put in acquiring information. Second, when the expert has an interest in the policy outcome, she may manipulate information to bring the policy decision more in line with her preferences. We show that experts who are unbiased toward the policy alternatives put highest effort in collecting information. Eliminating manipulation of information, however, requires that the preferences of the policy maker and the expert are aligned. Hence, when selecting an expert, policy makers face a trade-off. We show that policy makers optimally appoint experts with policy preferences which are less extreme than their own
Business · Decision maker · Economics · Information Policy · Management science · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Policy analysis · Political science · Public relations · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Media Influence and Politics · Public Administration
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| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,29 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2021 (17) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |