R Emre Aytimur
Biographic Data
| ID | 5733993 |
|---|---|
| NAME | R Emre Aytimur |
| GIVEN NAMES | R Emre |
| FAMILY NAME | Aytimur |
| SIGNATURE | AYTIMUR R E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Manchester |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3027-5999 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
How does political uncertainty affect the optimal degree of policy divergence
We examine how the optimal degree of policy divergence between two policy platforms in an election is affected by two types of aggregate uncertainty: policy-related and candidate-specific. We show that when the candidate-specific uncertainty is sufficiently large, policy convergence becomes optimal. We also show that when these two types of uncertainty co-exist, only purely office-motivated parties result in policy convergence, in other words, an…
Accountability with Large Electorates
We show that ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability. In our model, an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive fuzzy private signals about her performance. A sampling effect enables the incumbent to form a precise estimate of the median voter's signal, and the resulting level of accountability is as if the incumbent faced a perfectly informed social planner. Public i…
No prominent works on this page.
Accountability with Large Electorates
We show that ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability. In our model, an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive fuzzy private signals about her performance. A sampling effect enables the incumbent to form a precise estimate of the median voter's signal, and the resulting level of accountability is as if the incumbent faced a perfectly informed social planner. Public i…
How does political uncertainty affect the optimal degree of policy divergence
We examine how the optimal degree of policy divergence between two policy platforms in an election is affected by two types of aggregate uncertainty: policy-related and candidate-specific. We show that when the candidate-specific uncertainty is sufficiently large, policy convergence becomes optimal. We also show that when these two types of uncertainty co-exist, only purely office-motivated parties result in policy convergence, in other words, an…
Economics (2 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Accountability (1 works) · Business (1 works) · Comparative politics (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works)