Accountability with Large Electorates
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9712381 |
|---|---|
| Authors | R Emre Aytimur (0000-0003-3027-5999, University of Manchester, corresponding author), Christian Bruns (0000-0002-6906-4075, University of Goettingen) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 129 |
| Issue | 620 |
| Pages | 1529-1560 |
| Publication date | 2019-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12618 |
| OpenAlex | W2803908379 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 38 |
We show that ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability. In our model, an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive fuzzy private signals about her performance. A sampling effect enables the incumbent to form a precise estimate of the median voter's signal, and the resulting level of accountability is as if the incumbent faced a perfectly informed social planner. Public information or ideological preferences can impair the beneficial impact of the sampling effect on accountability; overconfidence of voters can restore the full benefit of the sampling effect
Accountability · Business · Economics · Ideology · Microeconomics · Overconfidence effect · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Sampling (signal processing · Social planner · Computer Science · Corruption and Economic Development · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Psychology · Social Psychology
Republic
Reputational Dynamics and Political Careers
The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II
Managerial Incentive Problems
Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I
A Group Rule—Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout
Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II
Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability
A Theory of Participation in Elections
Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
An economic theory of democracy
Against Democracy
Transparency in Politics and the Media
A Preface to Democratic Theory, Expanded Edition
Democracy for Realists
Overconfidence in Political Behavior
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
Ethical Voters and Costly Information Acquisition
Confirmation Bias and Electoral Accountability
Demand for Slant
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64
Voters, Issues, and Elections
Uninformed Votes
The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes
Issue Voting Under Uncertainty
The trouble with overconfidence
Competition and Truth in the Market for News
Is Voter Competence Good for Voters
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Convicting the Innocent
Condorcet's Theory of Voting
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |