Björn Bartling
Biographic Data
| ID | 5734866 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Björn Bartling |
| GIVEN NAMES | Björn |
| FAMILY NAME | Bartling |
| SIGNATURE | BARTLING B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Zurich |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9496-266X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Fairness in Winner-Take-All Competitions
This paper investigates fairness perceptions of extreme income inequality generated in winner-take-all competitions. Two large-scale experiments with more than 7,000 participants from the general population of the U.S. show that extreme earnings inequality is widely accepted, even when the winner only slightly outperforms the runner-up. The effect of the winning margin on inequality acceptance is modest compared to the effect of shifting the sour…
The Complementarity Between Trust and Contract Enforcement
Agreements are rarely fully enforceable, exposing trading parties to the risk of exploitation. In such cases, trust—defined as the belief in the trustworthiness of others—may be key to realizing gains from trade. This paper asks whether trust substitutes for or complements contract enforcement. While intuition may suggest trust matters more when enforcement is weak, our experiment, which exogenously varies both trust and enforcement, shows it can…
Does Market Interaction Erode Moral Values
The widespread use of markets leads to unprecedented material well-being in many societies. We study whether market interaction, as a side effect, erodes moral values. In an influential paper, Falk and Szech (2013) provide experimental data that seem to suggest that “market interaction erodes moral values.” Although we replicate their main treatment effect, we show that additional treatments are necessary to corroborate their conclusion. These tr…
Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction
In Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort, and (iv) employers pay high wages leaving rents to their workers. In this paper we show experimentally that the productivity increase due to discretion is not only suffi…
Wage inequality and team production
Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships
Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Profits are most frequently shared equally among the partners. The purpose of our paper is to provide a rationale for equal sharing rules. We show that with inequity-averse partners the equal sharing rule is the unique sharing rule that maximizes the partners' incentives to exert effort. We further show that inequity aversion can enhance efficiency in partnerships of given siz…
Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships
Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Profits are most frequently shared equally among the partners. The purpose of our paper is to provide a rationale for equal sharing rules. We show that with inequity-averse partners the equal sharing rule is the unique sharing rule that maximizes the partners' incentives to exert effort. We further show that inequity aversion can enhance efficiency in partnerships of given siz…
Wage inequality and team production
Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction
In Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort, and (iv) employers pay high wages leaving rents to their workers. In this paper we show experimentally that the productivity increase due to discretion is not only suffi…
Does Market Interaction Erode Moral Values
The widespread use of markets leads to unprecedented material well-being in many societies. We study whether market interaction, as a side effect, erodes moral values. In an influential paper, Falk and Szech (2013) provide experimental data that seem to suggest that “market interaction erodes moral values.” Although we replicate their main treatment effect, we show that additional treatments are necessary to corroborate their conclusion. These tr…
The Complementarity Between Trust and Contract Enforcement
Agreements are rarely fully enforceable, exposing trading parties to the risk of exploitation. In such cases, trust—defined as the belief in the trustworthiness of others—may be key to realizing gains from trade. This paper asks whether trust substitutes for or complements contract enforcement. While intuition may suggest trust matters more when enforcement is weak, our experiment, which exogenously varies both trust and enforcement, shows it can…
Fairness in Winner-Take-All Competitions
This paper investigates fairness perceptions of extreme income inequality generated in winner-take-all competitions. Two large-scale experiments with more than 7,000 participants from the general population of the U.S. show that extreme earnings inequality is widely accepted, even when the winner only slightly outperforms the runner-up. The effect of the winning margin on inequality acceptance is modest compared to the effect of shifting the sour…
Economics (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Economic inequality (2 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (2 works) · Inequality (2 works) · Labour economics (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works)