Tommaso M Valletti
Biographic Data
| ID | 5734929 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tommaso M Valletti |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tommaso M |
| FAMILY NAME | Valletti |
| SIGNATURE | VALLETTI T M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Imperial College London, University of Rome and CEPR |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Network Competition and Entry Deterrence
We develop a model of logit demand that extends the traditional duopoly framework of network competition to a multi-firm industry. First, we show that incumbents establish the reciprocal access charge inefficiently below cost when they compete in prices but they behave efficiently if they compete in utilities. Secondly, we study how incumbents determine the industry-wide access charge under the threat of entry. We show that incumbents may accommo…
The practice of access pricing: Telecommunications in the United Kingdom
Network Competition and Entry Deterrence
We develop a model of logit demand that extends the traditional duopoly framework of network competition to a multi-firm industry. First, we show that incumbents establish the reciprocal access charge inefficiently below cost when they compete in prices but they behave efficiently if they compete in utilities. Secondly, we study how incumbents determine the industry-wide access charge under the threat of entry. We show that incumbents may accommo…
The practice of access pricing: Telecommunications in the United Kingdom
The practice of access pricing: Telecommunications in the United Kingdom
Network Competition and Entry Deterrence
We develop a model of logit demand that extends the traditional duopoly framework of network competition to a multi-firm industry. First, we show that incumbents establish the reciprocal access charge inefficiently below cost when they compete in prices but they behave efficiently if they compete in utilities. Secondly, we study how incumbents determine the industry-wide access charge under the threat of entry. We show that incumbents may accommo…
Competition (biology (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · ICT Impact and Policies (2 works) · Accounting (1 works) · Business (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Computer security (1 works) · Corporate Governance and Law (1 works) · Cover (algebra (1 works) · Deterrence (psychology (1 works)