Network Competition and Entry Deterrence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9714618 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joan Calzada (0000-0002-2976-1677, Universitat de Barcelona and IREA‐PPRE), Tommaso Valletti (0000-0001-9728-5513, Imperial College London), Tommaso M Valletti (Imperial College London, University of Rome and CEPR) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 118 |
| Issue | 531 |
| Pages | 1223-1244 |
| Publication date | 2008-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02167.x |
| OpenAlex | W3121307237 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 17 |
We develop a model of logit demand that extends the traditional duopoly framework of network competition to a multi-firm industry. First, we show that incumbents establish the reciprocal access charge inefficiently below cost when they compete in prices but they behave efficiently if they compete in utilities. Secondly, we study how incumbents determine the industry-wide access charge under the threat of entry. We show that incumbents may accommodate all possible entrants, only a group of them, or may completely deter entry. When entry deterrence is the preferred option, incumbents distort the access charge upwards. Copyright (C) The Author(s). Journal compilation (C) Royal Economic Society 2008
Competition (biology · Deterrence (psychology · Deterrence theory · Economic history · Economics · Law and economics · Media studies · Political science · Sociology · Digital Platforms and Economics · ICT Impact and Policies · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,18 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2024 (16) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |