Thomas Mariotti
Biographic Data
| ID | 5735663 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Thomas Mariotti |
| GIVEN NAMES | Thomas |
| FAMILY NAME | Mariotti |
| SIGNATURE | MARIOTTI T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Toulouse School of Economics, CNRS, and University of Toulouse Capitole |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0525-8743 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Information Disclosure in Preemption Races: Blessing or (Winner's) Curse
Firms receiving independent signals on a common‐value risky project compete to be the first to invest. When firms are symmetric and competition is winner‐take‐all, rents are fully dissipated in equilibrium and the extent to which signals are publicly disclosed is irrelevant for welfare. When disclosure of signals is asymmetric, welfare is highest when firms are most asymmetric, and policies that uniformly promote disclosure may backfire, especial…
The Social Costs of Side Trading
We study resource allocation under private information when the planner cannot prevent bilateral side trading between consumers and firms. Adverse selection and side trading severely restrict feasible trades: each marginal quantity must be fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. The resulting social costs are twofold. First, second-best efficiency and robustness to side trading are in general irreconcilable requirements. Second, t…
Concurrence non exclusive et sélection adverse
Nous proposons dans cet article un survol de travaux récents sur la concurrence lorsqu’il y a sélection adverse et non-exclusivité, c’est-à-dire qu’un acheteur informé peut échanger simultanément avec plusieurs vendeurs. Nous discutons les issues d’équilibre de différents jeux, selon que l’on autorise des tarifs linéaires, en ordres-limite, convexes, ou arbitraires. Nous soulignons les difficultés d’existence de l’équilibre et caractérisons l’uni…
Issuance Costs and Stock Return Volatility
Subjective Discounting in an Exchange Economy
This paper describes the equilibrium of a discrete-time exchange economy in which consumers with arbitrary subjective discount factors and homothetic period utility functions follow linear Markov consumption and portfolio strategies. Explicit expressions are given for state prices and consumption-wealth ratios. We provide an analytically convenient continuous-time approximation and show how subjective rates of time preference affect risk-free rat…
Investment Timing Under Incomplete Information
Subjective Discounting in an Exchange Economy
This paper describes the equilibrium of a discrete-time exchange economy in which consumers with arbitrary subjective discount factors and homothetic period utility functions follow linear Markov consumption and portfolio strategies. Explicit expressions are given for state prices and consumption-wealth ratios. We provide an analytically convenient continuous-time approximation and show how subjective rates of time preference affect risk-free rat…
Investment Timing Under Incomplete Information
Subjective Discounting in an Exchange Economy
This paper describes the equilibrium of a discrete-time exchange economy in which consumers with arbitrary subjective discount factors and homothetic period utility functions follow linear Markov consumption and portfolio strategies. Explicit expressions are given for state prices and consumption-wealth ratios. We provide an analytically convenient continuous-time approximation and show how subjective rates of time preference affect risk-free rat…
Issuance Costs and Stock Return Volatility
Concurrence non exclusive et sélection adverse
Nous proposons dans cet article un survol de travaux récents sur la concurrence lorsqu’il y a sélection adverse et non-exclusivité, c’est-à-dire qu’un acheteur informé peut échanger simultanément avec plusieurs vendeurs. Nous discutons les issues d’équilibre de différents jeux, selon que l’on autorise des tarifs linéaires, en ordres-limite, convexes, ou arbitraires. Nous soulignons les difficultés d’existence de l’équilibre et caractérisons l’uni…
The Social Costs of Side Trading
We study resource allocation under private information when the planner cannot prevent bilateral side trading between consumers and firms. Adverse selection and side trading severely restrict feasible trades: each marginal quantity must be fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. The resulting social costs are twofold. First, second-best efficiency and robustness to side trading are in general irreconcilable requirements. Second, t…
Information Disclosure in Preemption Races: Blessing or (Winner's) Curse
Firms receiving independent signals on a common‐value risky project compete to be the first to invest. When firms are symmetric and competition is winner‐take‐all, rents are fully dissipated in equilibrium and the extent to which signals are publicly disclosed is irrelevant for welfare. When disclosure of signals is asymmetric, welfare is highest when firms are most asymmetric, and policies that uniformly promote disclosure may backfire, especial…
Economics (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Monetary economics (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Capital Investment and Risk Analysis (2 works) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Financial economics (2 works) · Financial Markets and Investment Strategies (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works)