Lawrence M Ausubel
Biographic Data
| ID | 5736301 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lawrence M Ausubel |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lawrence M |
| FAMILY NAME | Ausubel |
| SIGNATURE | AUSUBEL L M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Maryland, College Park |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction
The combinatorial clock auction (CCA) is an important recent innovation in auction design that has been utilised for many spectrum auctions worldwide. While the theoretical foundations of the CCA are described in a growing literature, many of the practical implementation choices are neglected. In this article, we examine some of the most critical practical decisions for a regulator implementing the CCA. Topics include: implementation of reserve p…
Virtual power plant auctions
Using forward markets to improve electricity market design
Package Bidding
[eng] Package Bidding Vickrey vs. Ascending Auctions The Vickrey and ascending package auctions are found to have identical equilibrium performance in the case where goods are substitutes. In the remaining cases, the Vickrey auction retains its incentive advantages ai the cost of setting prices that are so low that the outcome is not in the core of the corresponding exchange economy. The Vickrey auction also introduces blases that distort investm…
A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction
The combinatorial clock auction (CCA) is an important recent innovation in auction design that has been utilised for many spectrum auctions worldwide. While the theoretical foundations of the CCA are described in a growing literature, many of the practical implementation choices are neglected. In this article, we examine some of the most critical practical decisions for a regulator implementing the CCA. Topics include: implementation of reserve p…
Virtual power plant auctions
Using forward markets to improve electricity market design
Package Bidding
[eng] Package Bidding Vickrey vs. Ascending Auctions The Vickrey and ascending package auctions are found to have identical equilibrium performance in the case where goods are substitutes. In the remaining cases, the Vickrey auction retains its incentive advantages ai the cost of setting prices that are so low that the outcome is not in the core of the corresponding exchange economy. The Vickrey auction also introduces blases that distort investm…
Virtual power plant auctions
Using forward markets to improve electricity market design
A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction
The combinatorial clock auction (CCA) is an important recent innovation in auction design that has been utilised for many spectrum auctions worldwide. While the theoretical foundations of the CCA are described in a growing literature, many of the practical implementation choices are neglected. In this article, we examine some of the most critical practical decisions for a regulator implementing the CCA. Topics include: implementation of reserve p…
Computer Science (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Auction theory (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Common value auction (3 works) · Bidding (2 works) · Business (2 works) · Combinatorial auction (2 works) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (2 works)