A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9718042 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lawrence M Ausubel (University of Maryland, College Park), Oleg Baranov (0000-0003-4524-1433, University of Colorado Boulder) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 127 |
| Issue | 605 |
| Pages | F334-F350 |
| Publication date | 2017-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12404 |
| OpenAlex | W2765546553 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 9 |
The combinatorial clock auction (CCA) is an important recent innovation in auction design that has been utilised for many spectrum auctions worldwide. While the theoretical foundations of the CCA are described in a growing literature, many of the practical implementation choices are neglected. In this article, we examine some of the most critical practical decisions for a regulator implementing the CCA. Topics include: implementation of reserve prices; endogenous band plans; supplementary round activity rules; competition policy; bidding languages; and allocation of the core burden. We illustrate our discussion with examples from recent spectrum auctions that used the CCA format
Auction theory · Bidding · Combinatorial auction · Common value auction · Competition (biology · Competition policy · Core (optical fiber · Economics · Microeconomics · Operations research · Revenue equivalence · Spectrum auction · Telecommunications · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Digital Platforms and Economics · Engineering
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2023 (7) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |