Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions

An Experimental Study

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9715531
AutoresRegina Betz (University of Bayreuth), Ben Greiner (0000-0002-4493-8100, UNSW Sydney), Sascha Schweitzer (0000-0003-4154-6010, Zürcher Hochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften), Stefan Seifert (0000-0002-5139-9096, Vienna University of Economics and Business)
Año2017
Volumen127
Número605
PáginasF351-F371
Fecha de publicación2017-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12403
OpenAlexW80902378
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas29

We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed‐bid versus closed clock versus open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous versus sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi‐unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed‐bid auctions in terms of efficiency and revenues. This advantage disappears when the items are auctioned sequentially. In addition, auctioning sequentially has positive effects on total revenues across all auction formats, resulting from fiercer competition on the item auctioned first

Auction theory · Business · Common value auction · Economics · English auction · Forward auction · Generalized second-price auction · Microeconomics · Multiunit auction · Reverse auction · Sequence (biology · Unique bid auction · Unit (ring theory · Vickrey auction · Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction · Auction Theory and Applications · Chemistry · Computer Science · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Mathematics · Supply Chain and Inventory Management