Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Henrik Vetter

Biographic Data

ID5736378
NAMEHenrik Vetter
GIVEN NAMESHenrik
FAMILY NAMEVetter
SIGNATUREVETTER H
AFFILIATIONSAarhus University
ORCID0000-0002-8678-0137
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS1
TOTAL CITATIONS2
AUTHOR COUNT1
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1994
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1994
H-INDEX1
  • Do Turnover Costs Protect Insiders

    Henrik Vetter, Torben M Andersen•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1994•Cited by: 2•References: 2

    The ability of insiders to extract rents associates with exogenous turnover costs is addressed in a dynamic model. The higher these rents, the higher is the incentives for outsiders to obtain future insider status and thus to underbid current insiders. As a consequence there is a lower limit to the number of insiders which can avoid entrance of outsiders and the insiders cannot in each period obtain a rent equal to the turnover costs. The insider…

  • Do Turnover Costs Protect Insiders

    Henrik Vetter, Torben M Andersen•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1994•Cited by: 2•References: 2

    The ability of insiders to extract rents associates with exogenous turnover costs is addressed in a dynamic model. The higher these rents, the higher is the incentives for outsiders to obtain future insider status and thus to underbid current insiders. As a consequence there is a lower limit to the number of insiders which can avoid entrance of outsiders and the insiders cannot in each period obtain a rent equal to the turnover costs. The insider…

  • Do Turnover Costs Protect Insiders

    Henrik Vetter, Torben M Andersen•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1994•Cited by: 2•References: 2

    The ability of insiders to extract rents associates with exogenous turnover costs is addressed in a dynamic model. The higher these rents, the higher is the incentives for outsiders to obtain future insider status and thus to underbid current insiders. As a consequence there is a lower limit to the number of insiders which can avoid entrance of outsiders and the insiders cannot in each period obtain a rent equal to the turnover costs. The insider…

Business (1 works) · Economic Policies and Impacts (1 works) · Economic rent (1 works) · Economics (1 works) · Incentive (1 works) · Insider (1 works) · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality (1 works) · Labour economics (1 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (1 works) · Microeconomics (1 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae