Do Turnover Costs Protect Insiders
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9718220 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Henrik Vetter (0000-0002-8678-0137, Aarhus University), Torben M Andersen (0000-0001-5513-1890, Aarhus University) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 104 |
| Issue | 422 |
| Pages | 124 |
| Publication date | 1994-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2234679 |
| OpenAlex | W2067215374 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 2 |
The ability of insiders to extract rents associates with exogenous turnover costs is addressed in a dynamic model. The higher these rents, the higher is the incentives for outsiders to obtain future insider status and thus to underbid current insiders. As a consequence there is a lower limit to the number of insiders which can avoid entrance of outsiders and the insiders cannot in each period obtain a rent equal to the turnover costs. The insider model never explains a lower but may result in a higher employment level than in the case where all workers are wage-takers
Business · Economic rent · Economics · Incentive · Insider · Labour economics · Microeconomics · Turnover · Wage · Economic Policies and Impacts · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,08 |
| Citation span | 2001 - 2002 (2) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |