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I P L Png

Biographic Data

ID5736392
NAMEI P L Png
GIVEN NAMESI P L
FAMILY NAMEPng
SIGNATUREPNG I P L
AFFILIATIONSNUS Business School, National University of Singapore, 15 Kent Ridge Drive, Singapore 119245, Singapore
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS5
TOTAL CITATIONS72
WORKS AS AUTHOR5
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1991
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2018
H-INDEX2
  • Nonlabor Income and Age at Marriage

    Open Access•Junhong Chu, Haoming Liu et al.•ARTICLE•Demography•2018•Cited by: 1•References: 39

    We exploit China’s heating policy to investigate how nonlabor income affects marriage. From the mid-1950s, the policy gave substantial subsidies to urban residents north of the Huai River. Applying geographic regression discontinuity, we find that with the policy, urban men in the north married 15 months earlier than men in the south. The difference is substantial given that the average age at first marriage is 24.9 years for urban men in the sou…

  • Law and Innovation

    Ivan Png, I P L Png•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•2017

    Here, I study the effect of state enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) on R&D among U.S. businesses between 1979 and 1998. Using a new index of the legal protection of trade secrets, I find that the UTSA was associated with higher R&D among larger companies and those in high-tech industries. For the average company in the respective industry, the UTSA was associated with 3.2% more R&D in pharmaceuticals and 3.1% more R&D in computers…

  • Corruptible Law Enforcers

    Dilip Mookherjee, Ivan Png et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1995•Cited by: 63•References: 1

    We study the optimal compensation policy for a corruptible inspector, charged with monitoring pollution from a factory. Our utilitarian approach focuses on the trade-off among corruption, pollution, and enforcement effort. Owing to the strategic interaction between factory and inspector, changes in compensation policy have surprising effects, e.g., raising the penalty for corruption may cause pollution to increase. We find that bribery is an inef…

  • Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law

    Dilip Mookherjee, Ivan Png et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1994•Cited by: 8•References: 2

    The authors characterize optimal enforcement in a setting in which individuals can select among various levels of some activity, all of which are monitored at the same rate but may be prosecuted and punished at varying rates. For less harmful acts, marginal expected penalties ought to fall short of marginal harms caused. Indeed, some range of very minor acts should be legalized. For more harmful acts, whether marginal expected penalties should fa…

  • Most-Favored-Customer Protection versus Price Discrimination over Time

    Ivan Png, I P L Png•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1991•References: 2

    How should a seller price capacity that has no salvage value to heterogeneous customers whose valuations are private information? There are two periods, and the seller cannot precommit to prices in the later period. One option is price discrimination: first price high, then discount later if excess capacity remains. By offering most-favored-customer protection, the seller can charge more in advance, but will leave capacity unsold with positive pr…

  • Corruptible Law Enforcers

    Dilip Mookherjee, Ivan Png et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1995•Cited by: 63•References: 1

    We study the optimal compensation policy for a corruptible inspector, charged with monitoring pollution from a factory. Our utilitarian approach focuses on the trade-off among corruption, pollution, and enforcement effort. Owing to the strategic interaction between factory and inspector, changes in compensation policy have surprising effects, e.g., raising the penalty for corruption may cause pollution to increase. We find that bribery is an inef…

  • Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law

    Dilip Mookherjee, Ivan Png et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1994•Cited by: 8•References: 2

    The authors characterize optimal enforcement in a setting in which individuals can select among various levels of some activity, all of which are monitored at the same rate but may be prosecuted and punished at varying rates. For less harmful acts, marginal expected penalties ought to fall short of marginal harms caused. Indeed, some range of very minor acts should be legalized. For more harmful acts, whether marginal expected penalties should fa…

  • Nonlabor Income and Age at Marriage

    Open Access•Junhong Chu, Haoming Liu et al.•ARTICLE•Demography•2018•Cited by: 1•References: 39

    We exploit China’s heating policy to investigate how nonlabor income affects marriage. From the mid-1950s, the policy gave substantial subsidies to urban residents north of the Huai River. Applying geographic regression discontinuity, we find that with the policy, urban men in the north married 15 months earlier than men in the south. The difference is substantial given that the average age at first marriage is 24.9 years for urban men in the sou…

  • Most-Favored-Customer Protection versus Price Discrimination over Time

    Ivan Png, I P L Png•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1991•References: 2

    How should a seller price capacity that has no salvage value to heterogeneous customers whose valuations are private information? There are two periods, and the seller cannot precommit to prices in the later period. One option is price discrimination: first price high, then discount later if excess capacity remains. By offering most-favored-customer protection, the seller can charge more in advance, but will leave capacity unsold with positive pr…

  • Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law

    Dilip Mookherjee, Ivan Png et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1994•Cited by: 8•References: 2

    The authors characterize optimal enforcement in a setting in which individuals can select among various levels of some activity, all of which are monitored at the same rate but may be prosecuted and punished at varying rates. For less harmful acts, marginal expected penalties ought to fall short of marginal harms caused. Indeed, some range of very minor acts should be legalized. For more harmful acts, whether marginal expected penalties should fa…

  • Corruptible Law Enforcers

    Dilip Mookherjee, Ivan Png et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1995•Cited by: 63•References: 1

    We study the optimal compensation policy for a corruptible inspector, charged with monitoring pollution from a factory. Our utilitarian approach focuses on the trade-off among corruption, pollution, and enforcement effort. Owing to the strategic interaction between factory and inspector, changes in compensation policy have surprising effects, e.g., raising the penalty for corruption may cause pollution to increase. We find that bribery is an inef…

  • Law and Innovation

    Ivan Png, I P L Png•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•2017

    Here, I study the effect of state enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) on R&D among U.S. businesses between 1979 and 1998. Using a new index of the legal protection of trade secrets, I find that the UTSA was associated with higher R&D among larger companies and those in high-tech industries. For the average company in the respective industry, the UTSA was associated with 3.2% more R&D in pharmaceuticals and 3.1% more R&D in computers…

  • Nonlabor Income and Age at Marriage

    Open Access•Junhong Chu, Haoming Liu et al.•ARTICLE•Demography•2018•Cited by: 1•References: 39

    We exploit China’s heating policy to investigate how nonlabor income affects marriage. From the mid-1950s, the policy gave substantial subsidies to urban residents north of the Huai River. Applying geographic regression discontinuity, we find that with the policy, urban men in the north married 15 months earlier than men in the south. The difference is substantial given that the average age at first marriage is 24.9 years for urban men in the sou…

Economics (5 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Business (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Enforcement (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Law enforcement (2 works)

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