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Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law

Bibliographic Data

ID10182028
AuthorsDilip Mookherjee (0000-0001-8719-0991), Ivan Png (0000-0001-7463-5517), I P L Png
Year1994
Volume102
Issue5
Pages1039-1066
Publication date1994-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/261963
OpenAlexW2090154204
LanguageEN
Citations received12
References cited5

The authors characterize optimal enforcement in a setting in which individuals can select among various levels of some activity, all of which are monitored at the same rate but may be prosecuted and punished at varying rates. For less harmful acts, marginal expected penalties ought to fall short of marginal harms caused. Indeed, some range of very minor acts should be legalized. For more harmful acts, whether marginal expected penalties should fall short of or exceed marginal harms depends on the balance between monitoring and prosecution/punishment costs. The authors also explore how the optimal enforcement policy varies with changes in these costs. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press

Balance (ability · Deterrence (psychology · Economics · Enforcement · Law and economics · Law enforcement · Marginal cost · Marginal utility · Microeconomics · Political science · Public economics · Punishment (psychology · Auction Theory and Applications · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Regulation and Compliance Studies

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Unique citing works12
Citations per year0.46
Citation span2000 - 2026 (27)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 12

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