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Olivier Dagnelie

Biographic Data

ID5736459
NAMEOlivier Dagnelie
GIVEN NAMESOlivier
FAMILY NAMEDagnelie
SIGNATUREDAGNELIE O
AFFILIATIONSNew York University and Instituto de Análisis Económico, University of Namur
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS1
TOTAL CITATIONS4
WORKS AS AUTHOR1
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2007
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2007
H-INDEX1
  • Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects

    Open Access•Debraj Ray, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2007•Cited by: 4•References: 21

    nA group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project, in which efforts are not perfectly substitutable. The output is divided according to some given vector of shares. A share vector is unimprovable if no other share vector yields a higher sum of payoffs. When the elasticity of substitution across efforts is two or lower, only the perfectly equal share vector is unimprovable, and all other vectors can be improved via Lorenz domination. …

  • Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects

    Open Access•Debraj Ray, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2007•Cited by: 4•References: 21

    nA group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project, in which efforts are not perfectly substitutable. The output is divided according to some given vector of shares. A share vector is unimprovable if no other share vector yields a higher sum of payoffs. When the elasticity of substitution across efforts is two or lower, only the perfectly equal share vector is unimprovable, and all other vectors can be improved via Lorenz domination. …

  • Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects

    Open Access•Debraj Ray, Jean‐marie Baland et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2007•Cited by: 4•References: 21

    nA group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project, in which efforts are not perfectly substitutable. The output is divided according to some given vector of shares. A share vector is unimprovable if no other share vector yields a higher sum of payoffs. When the elasticity of substitution across efforts is two or lower, only the perfectly equal share vector is unimprovable, and all other vectors can be improved via Lorenz domination. …

Collective action (1 work) · Economic theories and models (1 work) · Economics (1 work) · Elasticity of substitution (1 work) · Engineering (1 work) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (1 work) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (1 work) · Inefficiency (1 work) · Inequality (1 work) · Joint (building (1 work)

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