Péter Eső
Biographic Data
| ID | 5736638 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Péter Eső |
| GIVEN NAMES | Péter |
| FAMILY NAME | Eső |
| SIGNATURE | ESŐ P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Department of Economics, University of Oxford |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 1 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 1 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Bargaining With Hard Evidence
This article studies how the presence of concealable hard evidence affects the timing of agreement and the size and distribution of surplus in bargaining. A buyer and a seller receive randomly arriving, verifiable, but concealable evidence about the value of a tradable good. Each party discloses individually favourable information but conceals signals that benefit the other side, giving rise to mutual suspicion; the seller repeatedly posts prices…
Bargaining With Hard Evidence
This article studies how the presence of concealable hard evidence affects the timing of agreement and the size and distribution of surplus in bargaining. A buyer and a seller receive randomly arriving, verifiable, but concealable evidence about the value of a tradable good. Each party discloses individually favourable information but conceals signals that benefit the other side, giving rise to mutual suspicion; the seller repeatedly posts prices…
Bargaining With Hard Evidence
This article studies how the presence of concealable hard evidence affects the timing of agreement and the size and distribution of surplus in bargaining. A buyer and a seller receive randomly arriving, verifiable, but concealable evidence about the value of a tradable good. Each party discloses individually favourable information but conceals signals that benefit the other side, giving rise to mutual suspicion; the seller repeatedly posts prices…
Auction Theory and Applications (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Distribution (mathematics (1 works) · Econometrics (1 works) · Economics (1 works) · Finance (1 works) · Finance (1 works) · Game Theory and Applications (1 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (1 works) · Horizon (1 works)