Bargaining With Hard Evidence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9718940 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Péter Eső (Department of Economics, University of Oxford), Chris Wallace (0000-0002-7536-0698, University of Manchester, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 129 |
| Issue | 621 |
| Pages | 2039-2063 |
| Publication date | 2019-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12632 |
| OpenAlex | W2806783410 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 41 |
This article studies how the presence of concealable hard evidence affects the timing of agreement and the size and distribution of surplus in bargaining. A buyer and a seller receive randomly arriving, verifiable, but concealable evidence about the value of a tradable good. Each party discloses individually favourable information but conceals signals that benefit the other side, giving rise to mutual suspicion; the seller repeatedly posts prices valid for one period. In the leading case of interest with a finite horizon and sufficiently patient players, the equilibrium is characterised by an interval of skimming (a sequence of prices acceptable only to a buyer who has learned that the good’s value is high) concluded by a single settlement period in which agreement is reached for sure. The length of delay until agreement and the corresponding efficiency loss are decreasing in the time horizon and in the abilities of the trading parties to identify the good’s value, but increasing in impatience. An arbitrarily long time horizon leads to immediate agreement if the parties are even slightly impatient and interaction is frequent enough; if the parties are perfectly patient, there is no trade without evidence disclosure
Distribution (mathematics · Econometrics · Economics · Horizon · Interval (graph theory · Microeconomics · Sequence (biology · Settlement (finance · Statistics · Time horizon · Value (mathematics · Verifiable secret sharing · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Finance · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics
The art and science of negotiation
Bargaining Theory with Applications
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Good News and Bad News
Bayesian Persuasion
Information, trade and common knowledge
Quality Disclosure and Certification
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
Long persuasion games
When does a firm disclose product information
Durable-Goods Monopolists
Selling Information
Theoretical Economics
What the Seller Won't Tell You
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |