Social Value of Public Information in Bargaining
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9705077 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Deepal Basak (0000-0001-7089-1177, Indiana University Bloomington, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 134 |
| Issue | 660 |
| Pages | 1356-1378 |
| Publication date | 2024-04-19 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/uead114 |
| OpenAlex | W4390113811 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 14 |
We consider a bargaining game in which both sides are uncertain about their opponent’s commitment, which leads to delay and welfare loss in equilibrium. We address the following question: does ex ante better public information about a player improve expected social welfare? We show that if the information cannot turn the bargaining table (turns the weak bargainer into a strong one and vice versa), more information does not help. More information about a weak bargainer has zero impact, whereas that about the strong bargainer is strictly detrimental. Moreover, by specialising in a binary signal structure, we show that if the information is more accurate in every state, it improves social welfare when it can turn the table
Complete information · Economics · Ex-ante · Information Structure · Market economy · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Public information · Social Welfare · Table (database · Value (mathematics · Welfare · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |