Information Disclosure in Contests

A Bayesian Persuasion Approach

Bibliographic Data

ID9716908
AuthorsJun Zhang (0000-0003-1706-1611, University of Technology Sydney), Junjie Zhou (0000-0002-7996-9548, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)
Year2016
Volume126
Issue597
Pages2197-2217
Publication date2016-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12277
OpenAlexW2049293157
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited20

We examine optimal information disclosure through Bayesian persuasion in a two‐player contest. One contestant’s valuation is commonly known and the other’s is his private information. The contest organiser can precommit to a signal to influence the uninformed contestant’s belief about the informed contestant. We show that to search for the optimal signal when the informed contestant’s valuation follows a binary distribution, it is without loss of generality to compare no disclosure with full disclosure; otherwise, such a restriction causes loss of generality. We propose a simple method to compute the optimal signal, which yields explicit solutions in some situations

Bayesian probability · Economics · Internet privacy · Persuasion · Artificial Intelligence · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Psychology · Social Psychology

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