Chris Wallace
Biographic Data
| ID | 3604755 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Chris Wallace |
| GIVEN NAMES | Chris |
| FAMILY NAME | Wallace |
| SIGNATURE | WALLACE C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Canberra |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7536-0698 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
“Fight where the enemy isn’t”: Cities as sites for energy transition policy moves against the grain of prevailing politics
Different spaces in multilevel governance systems, especially cities, present opportunities for energy transition initiatives even while climate denialist administrations are in office at the level of the nation-state. By “fighting where the enemy isn’t” in sub-national jurisdictions supportive of climate action, real gains can be made. The achievement of 100% renewable electricity in just ten years in Canberra, in the Australian Capital Territor…
Insiders and Outsiders, Winners and Losers: Close-Ups of the Struggle for Power and Status in Australia
Elite Economists and the Neoliberal Ascendancy in Australia: The Case of Dr John Hewson
‘Menzies biography mystery’: Robert Menzies and political biography as political intervention
The silhouette of an unpublished biography of Australia’s longest-serving prime minister flashed briefly into public view when journalist Allan Dawes, 69 years old and in failing health, died in Melbourne in 1969
Bargaining With Hard Evidence
This article studies how the presence of concealable hard evidence affects the timing of agreement and the size and distribution of surplus in bargaining. A buyer and a seller receive randomly arriving, verifiable, but concealable evidence about the value of a tradable good. Each party discloses individually favourable information but conceals signals that benefit the other side, giving rise to mutual suspicion; the seller repeatedly posts prices…
Information acquisition and use by networked players
Information Use and Acquisition In Price‐Setting Oligopolies
Asymmetric price‐setting multi‐product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions, where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross‐industry correlation of signals received from it. A signal’s influence on suppliers’ prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision. The emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfoli…
Evolution, Teamwork and Collective Action: Production Targets in the Private Provision of Public Goods
Collective-action problems arise when private actions generate common consequences; for example, the private provision of a public good. This article asks: what shapes of public-good production function work well when play evolves over time, and hence moves between equilibria? Welfare-maximising public-good production functions yield nothing when combined efforts fall below some threshold but otherwise maximally exploit the production-possibility…
The Evolution of Partnerships
In an evolutionary setting, players are allowed to choose not only their strategies for a particular game but also to some extent with whom they will play. This can lead to complex dynamics. Here, simulations are used to obtain some preliminary conclusions. It is shown that the ability to form fixed partnerships can enable players to coordinate on efficient outcomes. In scenarios where partnerships would lead to inefficient outcomes, they do not …
Gender, Citizenship, and Transition: Introduction to Special Issue
Journal Article Gender, Citizenship, and Transition: Introduction to Special Issue Get access CLAIRE WALLACE, CLAIRE WALLACE Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar KEITHA FINE KEITHA FINE Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, Volume 3, Issue 2-3, Summer 1996, Pages 237–242, https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/3.2-3.237 Pu…
Evolution, Teamwork and Collective Action: Production Targets in the Private Provision of Public Goods
Collective-action problems arise when private actions generate common consequences; for example, the private provision of a public good. This article asks: what shapes of public-good production function work well when play evolves over time, and hence moves between equilibria? Welfare-maximising public-good production functions yield nothing when combined efforts fall below some threshold but otherwise maximally exploit the production-possibility…
Information Use and Acquisition In Price‐Setting Oligopolies
Asymmetric price‐setting multi‐product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions, where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross‐industry correlation of signals received from it. A signal’s influence on suppliers’ prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision. The emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfoli…
Bargaining With Hard Evidence
This article studies how the presence of concealable hard evidence affects the timing of agreement and the size and distribution of surplus in bargaining. A buyer and a seller receive randomly arriving, verifiable, but concealable evidence about the value of a tradable good. Each party discloses individually favourable information but conceals signals that benefit the other side, giving rise to mutual suspicion; the seller repeatedly posts prices…
Gender, Citizenship, and Transition: Introduction to Special Issue
Journal Article Gender, Citizenship, and Transition: Introduction to Special Issue Get access CLAIRE WALLACE, CLAIRE WALLACE Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar KEITHA FINE KEITHA FINE Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, Volume 3, Issue 2-3, Summer 1996, Pages 237–242, https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/3.2-3.237 Pu…
The Evolution of Partnerships
In an evolutionary setting, players are allowed to choose not only their strategies for a particular game but also to some extent with whom they will play. This can lead to complex dynamics. Here, simulations are used to obtain some preliminary conclusions. It is shown that the ability to form fixed partnerships can enable players to coordinate on efficient outcomes. In scenarios where partnerships would lead to inefficient outcomes, they do not …
Evolution, Teamwork and Collective Action: Production Targets in the Private Provision of Public Goods
Collective-action problems arise when private actions generate common consequences; for example, the private provision of a public good. This article asks: what shapes of public-good production function work well when play evolves over time, and hence moves between equilibria? Welfare-maximising public-good production functions yield nothing when combined efforts fall below some threshold but otherwise maximally exploit the production-possibility…
Information Use and Acquisition In Price‐Setting Oligopolies
Asymmetric price‐setting multi‐product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions, where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross‐industry correlation of signals received from it. A signal’s influence on suppliers’ prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision. The emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfoli…
Bargaining With Hard Evidence
This article studies how the presence of concealable hard evidence affects the timing of agreement and the size and distribution of surplus in bargaining. A buyer and a seller receive randomly arriving, verifiable, but concealable evidence about the value of a tradable good. Each party discloses individually favourable information but conceals signals that benefit the other side, giving rise to mutual suspicion; the seller repeatedly posts prices…
Information acquisition and use by networked players
‘Menzies biography mystery’: Robert Menzies and political biography as political intervention
The silhouette of an unpublished biography of Australia’s longest-serving prime minister flashed briefly into public view when journalist Allan Dawes, 69 years old and in failing health, died in Melbourne in 1969
Insiders and Outsiders, Winners and Losers: Close-Ups of the Struggle for Power and Status in Australia
Elite Economists and the Neoliberal Ascendancy in Australia: The Case of Dr John Hewson
“Fight where the enemy isn’t”: Cities as sites for energy transition policy moves against the grain of prevailing politics
Different spaces in multilevel governance systems, especially cities, present opportunities for energy transition initiatives even while climate denialist administrations are in office at the level of the nation-state. By “fighting where the enemy isn’t” in sub-national jurisdictions supportive of climate action, real gains can be made. The achievement of 100% renewable electricity in just ten years in Canberra, in the Australian Capital Territor…
Computer Science (6 works) · Economics (6 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Game Theory and Applications (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Business (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Law (2 works)