Evolution, Teamwork and Collective Action
Production Targets in the Private Provision of Public Goods
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9706092 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David P Myatt (0009-0001-2657-7196, University of Oxford), Chris Wallace (0000-0002-7536-0698, University of Oxford) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 119 |
| Issue | 534 |
| Pages | 61-90 |
| Publication date | 2009-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02206.x |
| OpenAlex | W2144263316 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 54 |
Collective-action problems arise when private actions generate common consequences; for example, the private provision of a public good. This article asks: what shapes of public-good production function work well when play evolves over time, and hence moves between equilibria? Welfare-maximising public-good production functions yield nothing when combined efforts fall below some threshold but otherwise maximally exploit the production-possibility frontier. They generate multiple equilibria: coordinated teamwork is integral to successful collective actions. Optimal thresholds correspond to the output that individuals who pay all private costs but enjoy only private benefits would be just willing to provide. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009
Action (physics · Business · Collective action · Computer security · Economics · Exploit · Function (biology · Management · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political science · Private good · Production (economics · Public economics · Public good · Teamwork · Welfare · Work (physics · Yield (engineering · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Engineering · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications
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| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,6 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2023 (8) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |