Thomas H Noe
Biographic Data
| ID | 5737626 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Thomas H Noe |
| GIVEN NAMES | Thomas H |
| FAMILY NAME | Noe |
| SIGNATURE | NOE T H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oxford |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4068-1202 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Less Competition, More Meritocracy
Uncompetitive contests for grades, promotions, retention, and job assignments, which feature lax standards and limited candidate pools, are often criticized for being unmeritocratic. We show that when contestants are strategic, lax standards and exclusivity can make selection more meritocratic. When many contestants compete for a few promotions, strategic contestants adopt high-risk strategies. Risk-taking reduces the correlation between performa…
Turning Up the Heat
We study contests in which contestants are homogeneous and have convex effort costs. Increasing contest competitiveness, by making prizes more unequal, scaling up the competition, or adding new contestants, always discourages effort. These results have significant implications: although often criticized as evidence of laxity or cronyism, muting competition (e.g., adopting softer grading curves or less high-powered promotion systems) can both redu…
Comparing the Chosen
Consider a decision maker who selects between paired random draws from two unconditional distributions, always selecting the larger draw in the pair. When will the resulting selection-conditioned distributions be ordered by first-order stochastic or monotone likelihood ratio dominance? In various guises, this question arises in many economic contexts—tournaments, contests, auctions, cheap-talk games, announcement returns, qualitative choice model…
Cash Flows and Debt Maturity
In an asymmetric information framework, a number of authors have demonstrated the existence and uniqueness of short‐term debt pooling equilibria in the absence of dissipative costs. We show that short‐term debt pooling is robust to a broad range of deviations from stationarity and intertemporal independence. However, with intertemporal dependence, separating equilibria exist in which short‐term debt signals favourable information. Non‐stationary …
(Dutch) Auction Share Repurchases
Optimal shareholder bidding strategies in a dutch auction share repurchase are derived when shareholder heterogeneity could be due to either differential expectations regarding the firm's future earnings or differential tax bases. Predictions of the theory are tested by analyzing the actual tender premiums paid by firms completing dutch auction share repurchases. Copyright 1996 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
Turning Up the Heat
We study contests in which contestants are homogeneous and have convex effort costs. Increasing contest competitiveness, by making prizes more unequal, scaling up the competition, or adding new contestants, always discourages effort. These results have significant implications: although often criticized as evidence of laxity or cronyism, muting competition (e.g., adopting softer grading curves or less high-powered promotion systems) can both redu…
(Dutch) Auction Share Repurchases
Optimal shareholder bidding strategies in a dutch auction share repurchase are derived when shareholder heterogeneity could be due to either differential expectations regarding the firm's future earnings or differential tax bases. Predictions of the theory are tested by analyzing the actual tender premiums paid by firms completing dutch auction share repurchases. Copyright 1996 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
Cash Flows and Debt Maturity
In an asymmetric information framework, a number of authors have demonstrated the existence and uniqueness of short‐term debt pooling equilibria in the absence of dissipative costs. We show that short‐term debt pooling is robust to a broad range of deviations from stationarity and intertemporal independence. However, with intertemporal dependence, separating equilibria exist in which short‐term debt signals favourable information. Non‐stationary …
Turning Up the Heat
We study contests in which contestants are homogeneous and have convex effort costs. Increasing contest competitiveness, by making prizes more unequal, scaling up the competition, or adding new contestants, always discourages effort. These results have significant implications: although often criticized as evidence of laxity or cronyism, muting competition (e.g., adopting softer grading curves or less high-powered promotion systems) can both redu…
Comparing the Chosen
Consider a decision maker who selects between paired random draws from two unconditional distributions, always selecting the larger draw in the pair. When will the resulting selection-conditioned distributions be ordered by first-order stochastic or monotone likelihood ratio dominance? In various guises, this question arises in many economic contexts—tournaments, contests, auctions, cheap-talk games, announcement returns, qualitative choice model…
Less Competition, More Meritocracy
Uncompetitive contests for grades, promotions, retention, and job assignments, which feature lax standards and limited candidate pools, are often criticized for being unmeritocratic. We show that when contestants are strategic, lax standards and exclusivity can make selection more meritocratic. When many contestants compete for a few promotions, strategic contestants adopt high-risk strategies. Risk-taking reduces the correlation between performa…
Economics (5 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Econometrics (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works)