Manash Ranjan Gupta
Biographic Data
| ID | 5738797 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Manash Ranjan Gupta |
| GIVEN NAMES | Manash Ranjan |
| FAMILY NAME | Gupta |
| SIGNATURE | GUPTA M R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Jadavpur University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6494-3601 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1987 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Foreign Capital and the Informal Sector
The first model of Chandra and Khan (1993) has been extended in the following directions: (1) migration equilibrium condition has been generalized; (2) capital market distortion has been introduced; (3) land as an agricultural input has been considered. It appears that the Brecher–Alejandro (1977) proposition may lose its validity in some special cases
Informal sector and informal capital market in a small open less-developed economy
Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in Agriculture
The paper presents a theory of interest rate determination on informal credit in backward agriculture when there is a market for formal credit. The farmer has to bribe the official of the formal credit agency in order to get formal credit. The official and the moneylender play a non‐cooperative game in choosing the amount of formal credit and the informal interest rate, respectively. The informal‐sector interest rate and the effective formal‐sect…
Delayed formal credit, bribing and the informal credit market in agriculture
Tax on foreign capital income and wage subsidy to the urban sector in the Harris-Todaro model
Foreign capital, income inequality and welfare in a Harris-Todaro model
Rural-urban migation, informal sector and development policies A theoretical analysis
Credit and share-cropping
The shadow wage
Rural‐urban Migration and Urban Unemployment
Rural-urban migation, informal sector and development policies A theoretical analysis
Delayed formal credit, bribing and the informal credit market in agriculture
Informal sector and informal capital market in a small open less-developed economy
Foreign capital, income inequality and welfare in a Harris-Todaro model
The shadow wage
Rural‐urban Migration and Urban Unemployment
Credit and share-cropping
Rural-urban migation, informal sector and development policies A theoretical analysis
Foreign capital, income inequality and welfare in a Harris-Todaro model
Tax on foreign capital income and wage subsidy to the urban sector in the Harris-Todaro model
Delayed formal credit, bribing and the informal credit market in agriculture
Foreign Capital and the Informal Sector
The first model of Chandra and Khan (1993) has been extended in the following directions: (1) migration equilibrium condition has been generalized; (2) capital market distortion has been introduced; (3) land as an agricultural input has been considered. It appears that the Brecher–Alejandro (1977) proposition may lose its validity in some special cases
Informal sector and informal capital market in a small open less-developed economy
Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in Agriculture
The paper presents a theory of interest rate determination on informal credit in backward agriculture when there is a market for formal credit. The farmer has to bribe the official of the formal credit agency in order to get formal credit. The official and the moneylender play a non‐cooperative game in choosing the amount of formal credit and the informal interest rate, respectively. The informal‐sector interest rate and the effective formal‐sect…
Economics (10 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (6 works) · Market economy (6 works) · Labour economics (5 works) · Monetary economics (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Subsidy (4 works) · Taxation and Compliance Studies (4 works) · Capital (architecture (3 works) · Economic growth (3 works)