Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in Agriculture
A Theoretical Analysis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9724770 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Manash Ranjan Gupta (0000-0002-6494-3601, Jadavpur University), Sarbajit Chaudhuri (0000-0002-2369-4872) |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 254 |
| Pages | 331-343 |
| Publication date | 1997-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0335.00081 |
| OpenAlex | W2076818177 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 3 |
The paper presents a theory of interest rate determination on informal credit in backward agriculture when there is a market for formal credit. The farmer has to bribe the official of the formal credit agency in order to get formal credit. The official and the moneylender play a non‐cooperative game in choosing the amount of formal credit and the informal interest rate, respectively. The informal‐sector interest rate and the effective formal‐sector interest rate (incorporating the bribe) are equal in equilibrium. A reduction in the formal interest rate and/or an increase in the price of the product may lead to an increase in the equilibrium bribing rate and the informal interest rate when the formal credit and the informal credit are complementary to each other
Agriculture · Bond market · Business · Credit history · Economics · Financial system · Language change · Monetary economics · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Land Rights and Reforms · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion
On Finding Solutions to Ethical Problems in Agriculture
Formal and Informal Rural Credit in Four Provinces of Vietnam
Does Institutional Linkage of Bank‐ MFI Foster Inclusive Financial Development Even in the Presence of MFI Frauds
Multi-agent simulations to explore rules for rural credit in a highland farming community of Northern Thailand
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2003 - 2017 (15) |
| Highly cited | No |