Alvaro Forteza
Biographic Data
| ID | 5739458 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alvaro Forteza |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alvaro |
| FAMILY NAME | Forteza |
| SIGNATURE | FORTEZA A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad de la República de Uruguay |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8007-9032 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Separation of powers with ideological parties
Separation of powers with checks and balances (SP) is usually regarded as a key institution complementing elections in the control of elected officials. However, some analysts and many politicians also warn that excessive checks on the executive in the presence of polarization may lead to political inaction. We analyze the interaction between elections and SP, and study under what circumstances they complement each other. We first introduce a pol…
Perceptions of institutional quality and justification of tax evasion
When do Voters Weaken Checks and Balances to Facilitate Economic Reform
Strong checks and balances aimed at protecting citizens from government abuse of power are key features of well‐performing democracies. Nevertheless, some presidents have enjoyed strong and often explicit popular support when they undermined these controls. We present a formal model of the trade‐off between control on the executive and delegation to analyse voters’ decisions on the strength of checks and balances. We argue that voters may support…
Political Selection with Cynical Voters
I consider political agency models with endogenous entry of candidates. Two equilibria may arise, one in which only good individuals go into politics and another in which both bad and good individuals do so. These equilibria are self-fulfilling prophecies: voter cynicism raises the survival probabilities of bad politicians and thus induces bad citizens to start a career in politics. If the proportion of good individuals in the society is sufficie…
Social Security and Retirement in Uruguay
We estimate a structural life-cycle model for retirement behaviour using work history records of the main Uruguayan pension programme. The estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is around 1.5 and the estimated discount rate is about 1.8 per cent per annum. The marginal disutility of work increases with age and is larger for women than men, and for private than public employees. Simulations show a very low impact of the 1995 pension refor…
When do Voters Weaken Checks and Balances to Facilitate Economic Reform
Strong checks and balances aimed at protecting citizens from government abuse of power are key features of well‐performing democracies. Nevertheless, some presidents have enjoyed strong and often explicit popular support when they undermined these controls. We present a formal model of the trade‐off between control on the executive and delegation to analyse voters’ decisions on the strength of checks and balances. We argue that voters may support…
Political Selection with Cynical Voters
I consider political agency models with endogenous entry of candidates. Two equilibria may arise, one in which only good individuals go into politics and another in which both bad and good individuals do so. These equilibria are self-fulfilling prophecies: voter cynicism raises the survival probabilities of bad politicians and thus induces bad citizens to start a career in politics. If the proportion of good individuals in the society is sufficie…
Social Security and Retirement in Uruguay
We estimate a structural life-cycle model for retirement behaviour using work history records of the main Uruguayan pension programme. The estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is around 1.5 and the estimated discount rate is about 1.8 per cent per annum. The marginal disutility of work increases with age and is larger for women than men, and for private than public employees. Simulations show a very low impact of the 1995 pension refor…
Perceptions of institutional quality and justification of tax evasion
When do Voters Weaken Checks and Balances to Facilitate Economic Reform
Strong checks and balances aimed at protecting citizens from government abuse of power are key features of well‐performing democracies. Nevertheless, some presidents have enjoyed strong and often explicit popular support when they undermined these controls. We present a formal model of the trade‐off between control on the executive and delegation to analyse voters’ decisions on the strength of checks and balances. We argue that voters may support…
Separation of powers with ideological parties
Separation of powers with checks and balances (SP) is usually regarded as a key institution complementing elections in the control of elected officials. However, some analysts and many politicians also warn that excessive checks on the executive in the presence of polarization may lead to political inaction. We analyze the interaction between elections and SP, and study under what circumstances they complement each other. We first introduce a pol…
Economics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Public economics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works)