When do Voters Weaken Checks and Balances to Facilitate Economic Reform
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9726696 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alvaro Forteza (0000-0002-8007-9032, dECON‐FCS Universidad de la República Uruguay), Juan Sebastián Pereyra (0000-0002-3227-9531, Universidad de la República de Uruguay) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 86 |
| Issue | 344 |
| Pages | 775-800 |
| Publication date | 2019-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecca.12290 |
| OpenAlex | W2888211677 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 40 |
Strong checks and balances aimed at protecting citizens from government abuse of power are key features of well‐performing democracies. Nevertheless, some presidents have enjoyed strong and often explicit popular support when they undermined these controls. We present a formal model of the trade‐off between control on the executive and delegation to analyse voters’ decisions on the strength of checks and balances. We argue that voters may support their loosening, even when this allows rent extraction, if they are convinced that checks on the executive are blocking necessary reforms. We discuss several cases of strong presidents in Latin America who, alleging that radical reforms were necessary, obtained popular support that allowed them to loosen checks on the executive. Some of these presidents had a pro‐market and some an anti‐market reform agenda so, as our model suggests, voters’ willingness to remove checks and balances can emerge under both right‐ and left‐wing executives
Business · Control (management) · Delegation · Economics · Executive branch · Government (linguistics) · Latin Americans · Law and economics · Management · Political science · Politics · Power (physics) · Public economics · Separation of powers · Corruption and Economic Development · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law
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| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,75 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |