Political Accountability Under Alternative Institutional Regimes
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299142 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew C Stephenson (Harvard Law School, Griswold 509, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA, corresponding author), Jide O Nzelibe (Northwestern University Law School, 357 East Chicago Avenue, Chicago, IL 60611, USA), Jide Nzelibe (Northwestern University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 139-167 |
| Publication date | 2010-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629809359037 |
| OpenAlex | W3021705371 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 28 |
We analyze the interaction between electoral accountability and separation-of-powers by comparing three regimes: ‘Unilateral Authority’ (the President has exclusive decision-making power); ‘Mandatory Checks’ (the President cannot change policy without congressional assent); and ‘Opt-in Checks’ (the President may seek congressional authorization or act unilaterally). We find: (1) voters use asymmetric electoral rewards and punishments to offset the risk of politician bias, but voters rely less on this blunt instrument if there are internal checks; (2) adding a veto player need not alter the ex ante likelihood of policy change; and (3) voter welfare is highest under Opt-In Checks and lowest under Unilateral Authority
Accountability · Economics · Ex-ante · Law and economics · Macroeconomics · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Separation of powers · Veto · Welfare · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Public Administration
Judicial Review as a Response to Political Posturing
Presidential Unilateral Action as a Tool of Voter Mobilization
Separation of powers with ideological parties
When do Voters Weaken Checks and Balances to Facilitate Economic Reform
Energy versus safety
Representation, sophisticated voting, and the size of the gridlock region
On the separation of executive and legislative powers
The Rule of Law in the Fight against Terrorism
“When the Devil Turns … ”
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy
Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians
The Politician and the Judge
Presidential Administration
The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth
The presidential power of unilateral action
Veto Players
The Logic of Political Survival
The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Legislative choice of regulatory forms
Presidents and the Prospective Voter
A Revisionist View of the Separation of Powers
Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection
The Politics of Blame
A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting
Leadership and Pandering
Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining
Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors
Decision Making in Political Systems
Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect Oversight
A Model of the Political Economy of the United States
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,53 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2021 (11) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |