Dimitrios P Tsomocos
Biographic Data
| ID | 5739631 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dimitrios P Tsomocos |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dimitrios P |
| FAMILY NAME | Tsomocos |
| SIGNATURE | TSOMOCOS D P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oxford |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8744-0217 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Optimal Bank Regulation in the Presence of Credit and Run Risk
We modify the 1983 Diamond and Dybvig model so that banks offer liquidity services to depositors, raise equity funding, make risky loans, and invest in safe, liquid assets. Banks monitor borrowers to ensure that they repay loans and they are susceptible to depositor runs. We model the run decision by solving a novel global game. Relative to a social planner, banks opt for a more deposit-intensive capital structure, their assets may be more or les…
Support for small businesses amid Covid‐19
How should the government support small and medium‐sized enterprises amid a pandemic crisis while balancing the trade‐off between short‐run stabilization and long‐run allocative efficiency? We develop a two‐sector equilibrium model featuring small businesses with private information on their likely future success and a screening contract. Businesses in the sector adversely affected by a pandemic can apply for government loans to stay afloat. A pr…
General Equilibrium Analysis of the Czech Financial Market and a Financial Fragility Model
The purpose of this paper is to create a financial fragility model for the Czech financial sector. We adapt the Goodhart-Tsomocos model which is based on general equilibrium with incomplete markets, money and default. The calibration of the model is based on publicly available data from the period 2003-2011. Finally, we perform comparative statics to show how the key variables of the model respond to possible events. The model can be used by gove…
Peut-on encore sauver Athènes
La Grèce dispose d'un répit provisoire grâce aux aides européennes. Pourtant la sortie de l'euro, partielle ou complète aurait-elle été envisageable, comme la solution la moins éprouvante ? La crise grecque rappelle à l'Europe la nécessité de l'avancée vers un projet politique commun et un contrôle des transactions financières
Optimal Bank Regulation in the Presence of Credit and Run Risk
We modify the 1983 Diamond and Dybvig model so that banks offer liquidity services to depositors, raise equity funding, make risky loans, and invest in safe, liquid assets. Banks monitor borrowers to ensure that they repay loans and they are susceptible to depositor runs. We model the run decision by solving a novel global game. Relative to a social planner, banks opt for a more deposit-intensive capital structure, their assets may be more or les…
Peut-on encore sauver Athènes
La Grèce dispose d'un répit provisoire grâce aux aides européennes. Pourtant la sortie de l'euro, partielle ou complète aurait-elle été envisageable, comme la solution la moins éprouvante ? La crise grecque rappelle à l'Europe la nécessité de l'avancée vers un projet politique commun et un contrôle des transactions financières
General Equilibrium Analysis of the Czech Financial Market and a Financial Fragility Model
The purpose of this paper is to create a financial fragility model for the Czech financial sector. We adapt the Goodhart-Tsomocos model which is based on general equilibrium with incomplete markets, money and default. The calibration of the model is based on publicly available data from the period 2003-2011. Finally, we perform comparative statics to show how the key variables of the model respond to possible events. The model can be used by gove…
Optimal Bank Regulation in the Presence of Credit and Run Risk
We modify the 1983 Diamond and Dybvig model so that banks offer liquidity services to depositors, raise equity funding, make risky loans, and invest in safe, liquid assets. Banks monitor borrowers to ensure that they repay loans and they are susceptible to depositor runs. We model the run decision by solving a novel global game. Relative to a social planner, banks opt for a more deposit-intensive capital structure, their assets may be more or les…
Support for small businesses amid Covid‐19
How should the government support small and medium‐sized enterprises amid a pandemic crisis while balancing the trade‐off between short‐run stabilization and long‐run allocative efficiency? We develop a two‐sector equilibrium model featuring small businesses with private information on their likely future success and a screening contract. Businesses in the sector adversely affected by a pandemic can apply for government loans to stay afloat. A pr…
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Global Financial Crisis and Policies (2 works) · Government (linguistics) (2 works) · Macroeconomics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works)