Ulrich Kamecke
Biographic Data
| ID | 5739890 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ulrich Kamecke |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ulrich |
| FAMILY NAME | Kamecke |
| SIGNATURE | KAMECKE U |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bonn |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
What is Crime?
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
Internalization of Knowledge Spillovers in R&D Joint Ventures
Under constant returns to scale the only justification for joint ventures are externalities from knowledge spillovers. In a two-stage game we compare the incentives for integrated cartels and cartels with downstream competition. The externalities introduce an underinvestment incentive. Under downstream competition this effect is reinforced because a commitment to higher short run marginal costs increases the profits. In the integrated cartels the…
Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft
Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft: The Declining Need for Centralized Coordination in a Networked World
The Proper Scope of Government Viewed from an Ordoliberal Perspective
The Proper Scope of Government Viewed from an Ordoliberal Perspective: The Example of Competition Policy
Dominance solvable English matching auctions
Mean City—A Consistent Approximation of Bid Rent Equilibria
Two Sided Matching
Introduction Part I. One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model: 2. Stable matchings 3. The structure of the set of stable matchings 4. Strategic questions Part II. Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers: 5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns 6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences Part III. Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable: 7. A simp…
Testing the rank size rule hypothesis with an efficient estimator
Two Sided Matching
Introduction Part I. One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model: 2. Stable matchings 3. The structure of the set of stable matchings 4. Strategic questions Part II. Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers: 5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns 6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences Part III. Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable: 7. A simp…
Mean City—A Consistent Approximation of Bid Rent Equilibria
Testing the rank size rule hypothesis with an efficient estimator
Testing the rank size rule hypothesis with an efficient estimator
Two Sided Matching
Introduction Part I. One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model: 2. Stable matchings 3. The structure of the set of stable matchings 4. Strategic questions Part II. Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers: 5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns 6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences Part III. Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable: 7. A simp…
Mean City—A Consistent Approximation of Bid Rent Equilibria
The Proper Scope of Government Viewed from an Ordoliberal Perspective
The Proper Scope of Government Viewed from an Ordoliberal Perspective: The Example of Competition Policy
Dominance solvable English matching auctions
Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft
Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft: The Declining Need for Centralized Coordination in a Networked World
Internalization of Knowledge Spillovers in R&D Joint Ventures
Under constant returns to scale the only justification for joint ventures are externalities from knowledge spillovers. In a two-stage game we compare the incentives for integrated cartels and cartels with downstream competition. The externalities introduce an underinvestment incentive. Under downstream competition this effect is reinforced because a commitment to higher short run marginal costs increases the profits. In the integrated cartels the…
What is Crime?
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions
»Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495
Economics (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Econometrics (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Statistics (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Common value auction (2 works)