Two Sided Matching
A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9728117 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ulrich Kamecke, Marcos Sotomayor (0000-0002-3333-1805, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 236 |
| Pages | 487 |
| Publication date | 1992-11-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | REVIEW |
| Review of | Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Alvin E Roth, 2003 |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2554894 |
| OpenAlex | W2143529993 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
Introduction Part I. One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model: 2. Stable matchings 3. The structure of the set of stable matchings 4. Strategic questions Part II. Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers: 5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns 6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences Part III. Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable: 7. A simple model of one seller and many buyers 8. The assignment game 9. The generalization of the assignment model Part IV. Epilogue: 10. Open questions and research directions Bibliography Indexes
Econometrics · Matching (statistics) · Mathematical economics · Statistics · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics
Digital revolution or anthropocenic feedback
Experimental Methods of Research on Corruption in Economic Theory and Sociology
Patterns of Alcohol Consumption as a Social Group Indicator in Modern Russian Cities
Network Structures in Industrial Pricing
Kin Preference and Partner Choice
The Usefulness of Core Theory in Economics
The Job Market for New Economists
Theories of Sexual Stratification
A comprehensive secondary market model for virtualized wireless connectivity
Cosigned vs. group loans
An odd and inseparable couple
Matching with aggregate externalities
What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
Coalition formation games with separable preferences
Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings
Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets
Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings
The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
Becker’s assortative assignments
The presence of lattice theory in discrete problems of mathematical social sciences. Why
On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
Inspired and inspiring
An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings
Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
Households, markets and public choice
Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems
Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
Borda-induced hedonic games with friends, enemies, and neutral players
Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism
Incomplete information, credibility and the core
Task assignment with controlled and autonomous agents
Estimating Two-Sided Logit Models
Dynamic Network Actor Models
Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Residential Preferences, Residential Mobility, and Neighborhood Change
Models for Generalized Location Systems
Eine Antwort auf meine Kommentatoren
Enjeux stratégiques du concours de recrutement des enseignants-chercheurs
Choix d'écoles en France
Package Bidding
Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets
Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks
Son Preference, Sex Ratios, and Marriage Patterns
Who Marries Whom and Why
Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market
On the Segmentation of Markets
Risk Sharing, Sorting, and Early Contracting
Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing
Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market
Culture, Information, and Screening Discrimination
The Analytics of the Pricing of Higher Education and Other Services in Which the Customers Are Inputs
The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with Coordination Frictions
Marriage strategy among the European nobility
A General Equilibrium Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy Law
The Role of Paternity Presumption and Custodial Rights for Understanding Marriage Patterns
Family Theory
Coevolution of Decision‐Making and Social Environments
Matching and Sorting in Online Dating
School Choice
The Economist as Engineer
| Highly cited | No |
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