Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Roderick M Hills

Biographic Data

ID5754595
NAMERoderick M Hills
GIVEN NAMESRoderick M
FAMILY NAMEHills
SIGNATUREHILLS R M
AFFILIATIONSNew York Law School
ORCID0009-0005-2056-0149
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS5
TOTAL CITATIONS5
AUTHOR COUNT5
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2001
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX1
  • The last emperor? lessons for the prospects of liberal authoritarianism from Xi Jinping’s China

    Roderick M Hills•ARTICLE•Theoretical Inquiries in Law•2025

    After China seemed to weather the 2008 financial crisis much better than its liberal democratic competitors, many commentators and scholars contemplated the possibility that nondemocratic regimes could compete successfully by achieving stability, prosperity, and power that eluded rival forms of government. By 2024, however, the sheen has rubbed off the China model. Xi Jinping’s China seems plagued by the related problems of high municipal debt, o…

  • The challenge of regionalist institutions without regionalist politics

    Roderick M Hills•ARTICLE•Theoretical Inquiries in Law•2023

    Scholarship on regionalist institutions lacks a theory of regionalist politics because we lack regional political parties, without which regional politics is difficult. Particularly in the United States, regional governments are the product of either intergovernmental agreements between governments controlled by ostensibly national parties or state statutes and federal grants administered by ostensibly nonpartisan bureaucrats. The absence of trul…

  • Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated Powers

    Richard A Primus, Richard Primus et al.•ARTICLE•Michigan Law Review•2021

    Despite longstanding orthodoxy, the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers does virtually nothing to limit federal lawmaking. That’s not because of some bizarrely persistent judicial failure to read the Constitution correctly. It’s because the enumeration of congressional powers is not a well-designed technology for limiting federal legislation. Rather than trying to make the enumeration do work that it will not do, decisionmakers sho…

  • The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power

    Roderick M Hills•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•2001

    Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 5, Symposium: Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sovereign Immunity (May, 2001), pp. 1225-1258

  • State Autonomy in Germany and the United States

    Open Access•Daniel Halberstam, Roderick M Hills•ARTICLE•The Annals of the American…•2001•Cited by: 5•References: 7

    Both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have mechanisms by which their component jurisdictions—states or Länder—can either implement federal law or resist such implementation. The authors describe the different constitutional mechanisms by which the two federal regimes induce state cooperation and protect state autonomy. They then offer some speculations as to how such constitutional rules might affect cooperative federalism in…

  • State Autonomy in Germany and the United States

    Open Access•Daniel Halberstam, Roderick M Hills•ARTICLE•The Annals of the American…•2001•Cited by: 5•References: 7

    Both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have mechanisms by which their component jurisdictions—states or Länder—can either implement federal law or resist such implementation. The authors describe the different constitutional mechanisms by which the two federal regimes induce state cooperation and protect state autonomy. They then offer some speculations as to how such constitutional rules might affect cooperative federalism in…

  • The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power

    Roderick M Hills•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•2001

    Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 5, Symposium: Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sovereign Immunity (May, 2001), pp. 1225-1258

  • State Autonomy in Germany and the United States

    Open Access•Daniel Halberstam, Roderick M Hills•ARTICLE•The Annals of the American…•2001•Cited by: 5•References: 7

    Both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have mechanisms by which their component jurisdictions—states or Länder—can either implement federal law or resist such implementation. The authors describe the different constitutional mechanisms by which the two federal regimes induce state cooperation and protect state autonomy. They then offer some speculations as to how such constitutional rules might affect cooperative federalism in…

  • Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated Powers

    Richard A Primus, Richard Primus et al.•ARTICLE•Michigan Law Review•2021

    Despite longstanding orthodoxy, the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers does virtually nothing to limit federal lawmaking. That’s not because of some bizarrely persistent judicial failure to read the Constitution correctly. It’s because the enumeration of congressional powers is not a well-designed technology for limiting federal legislation. Rather than trying to make the enumeration do work that it will not do, decisionmakers sho…

  • The challenge of regionalist institutions without regionalist politics

    Roderick M Hills•ARTICLE•Theoretical Inquiries in Law•2023

    Scholarship on regionalist institutions lacks a theory of regionalist politics because we lack regional political parties, without which regional politics is difficult. Particularly in the United States, regional governments are the product of either intergovernmental agreements between governments controlled by ostensibly national parties or state statutes and federal grants administered by ostensibly nonpartisan bureaucrats. The absence of trul…

  • The last emperor? lessons for the prospects of liberal authoritarianism from Xi Jinping’s China

    Roderick M Hills•ARTICLE•Theoretical Inquiries in Law•2025

    After China seemed to weather the 2008 financial crisis much better than its liberal democratic competitors, many commentators and scholars contemplated the possibility that nondemocratic regimes could compete successfully by achieving stability, prosperity, and power that eluded rival forms of government. By 2024, however, the sheen has rubbed off the China model. Xi Jinping’s China seems plagued by the related problems of high municipal debt, o…

Politics (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · American Constitutional Law and Politics (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Federalism (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Constitution (2 works) · Democracy (2 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae