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State Autonomy in Germany and the United States

Bibliographic Data

ID9769361
AuthorsDaniel Halberstam (University of Michigan Law School, corresponding author), Roderick M Hills (0009-0005-2056-0149, University of Michigan Law School)
Year2001
Volume574
Issue1
Pages173-184
Publication date2001-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0002-7162 • E-ISSN: 1552-3349
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/000271620157400113
OpenAlexW2164745089
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited11

Both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have mechanisms by which their component jurisdictions—states or Länder—can either implement federal law or resist such implementation. The authors describe the different constitutional mechanisms by which the two federal regimes induce state cooperation and protect state autonomy. They then offer some speculations as to how such constitutional rules might affect cooperative federalism in the two nations, arguing that the German system provides more categorical and therefore more secure protection of the Länder, whereas the U.S. system provides for a more flexible system of cooperative federalism. This flexibility of the U.S. system, the authors suggest, allows for vertical competition between the federal government and the states, which may provide a valuable tool to combat inefficiency in policy implementation

Autonomy · Competition (biology · Constitutional law · Cooperative federalism · Decentralization · Economics · Federal state · Federalism · Flexibility (engineering · Government (linguistics · Inefficiency · Law and economics · Market economy · Political science · Politics · State (computer science · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Computer Science · Law · Law and Political Science · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration

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Unique citing works6
Citations per year0,38
Citation span2005 - 2021 (17)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 8

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