Daryl G Press
Biographic Data
| ID | 5769361 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daryl G Press |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daryl G |
| FAMILY NAME | Press |
| SIGNATURE | PRESS D G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Daryl G. Press is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 292 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
US-South Korea Nuclear Sharing
Since North Korea’s first nuclear weapons test in 2006, its threat to South Korea has grown significantly. This article assesses South Korea’s changing threat environment and explores its options for strengthening deterrence. We make three key arguments. First, South Korea’s concerns about the state of deterrence on the Peninsula are well founded with growing nuclear dangers and declining credibility of the US extended deterrent. Second, leaders …
Access Denied? The Sino-American Contest for Military Primacy in Asia
How has the balance of power shifted in maritime East Asia, and what does this change mean for the U.S.-China military competition in the region? We examine these questions by focusing on a central pillar of U.S. military might—land-based air power—in the context of a war over Taiwan. We create a new, unclassified, and transparent model of a Taiwan conflict, which allows users to explore multiple scenarios, alternative U.S. basing options, variou…
The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution
Leading analysts have predicted for decades that nuclear weapons would help pacify international politics. The core notion is that countries protected by these fearsome weapons can stop competing so intensely with their adversaries: they can end their arms races, scale back their alliances, and stop jockeying for strategic territory. But rarely have theory and practice been so opposed. Why do international relations in the nuclear age remain so c…
Myth of the Nuclear Revolution
Markets or Mercantilism? How China Secures Its Energy Supplies
Since oil began fueling the global economy, governments have employed policies of “energy mercantilism” to secure access to this key input. Critics of these policies claim they are unnecessary because oil can be acquired on global markets. Countries such as China that engage in energy mercantilism are thus neither enhancing their energy security nor threatening others' access to oil. These critics, however, misunderstand the logic of energy merca…
The New Era of Counterforce
Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, “counterforce” disarming attacks—those aimed at eliminating an opponent's nuclear forces—were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around …
Enduring Resilience
Plentiful spare capacity persists in the oil production and tanker industries, contrary to Michael Levi's contention in his response to our earlier article, “Protecting ‘The Prize.' ” OPEC leaders retain excess capacity to minimize cartel members' cheating, and tanker companies retain considerable flexibility that allows them to adapt to political-military and other fluctuations in the market. Oil supplies are not on a knife-edge; exaggerated cla…
Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists
Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran's nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely…
Atomic Aversion
How strong are normative prohibitions on state behavior? We examine this question by analyzing anti-nuclear norms, sometimes called the "nuclear taboo," using an original survey experiment to evaluate American attitudes regarding nuclear use. We find that the public has only a weak aversion to using nuclear weapons and that this aversion has few characteristics of an "unthinkable" behavior or taboo. Instead, public attitudes about whether to use …
Protecting “The Prize”
American national security policy is based on a misunderstanding about U.S. oil interests. Although oil is a vital commodity, potential supply disruptions are less worrisome than scholars, politicians, and pundits presume. This article identifies four adaptive mechanisms that together can compensate for almost all oil shocks, meaning that continuous supply to consumers will limit scarcity-induced price increases. The adaptive mechanisms are not p…
The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy
January 01 2007 The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy? Jeffrey S. Lantis, Jeffrey S. Lantis Jeffrey S. Lantis is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The College of Wooster. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Tom Sauer, Tom Sauer Tom Sauer is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Antwerp and a postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders at the Katholieke Un…
The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy
For nearly half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear-armed states have been locked in a condition of mutual assured destruction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The U.S. nuclear arsenal has steadily improved; the Russian force has sharply eroded; and Chinese nuclear modernization has progressed at a glacial pace. As a result, the United States now stands on the verge of attaining nucle…
The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy
FOR ALMOST half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear states have been locked in a military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 196os, the nuclear arsenals ofthe United States and the Soviet Union had grown so large and sophisticated that neither country could entirely destroy the other's retaliatory force by launching first, even with a surprise attack. Starting a nuclear war was therefore tantamount to commi…
The Credibility of Power
became chancellor of Germany and immediately began breaking his country’s international agreements. From 1933 to 1938 Germany violated its treaty commitments by rearming, remilitarizing the Rhineland, and seizing Austria.1 Although Britain and France complained after each German violation, they refused to respond with force. In September 1938 Hitler threatened to invade Czechoslovakia unless Germany was given a piece of Czech territory called the…
The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare
International Security - Volume 26, Number 2, Fall 2001
The effects of wars on neutral countries
Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf
Come Home, America
Atomic Aversion
How strong are normative prohibitions on state behavior? We examine this question by analyzing anti-nuclear norms, sometimes called the "nuclear taboo," using an original survey experiment to evaluate American attitudes regarding nuclear use. We find that the public has only a weak aversion to using nuclear weapons and that this aversion has few characteristics of an "unthinkable" behavior or taboo. Instead, public attitudes about whether to use …
The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy
For nearly half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear-armed states have been locked in a condition of mutual assured destruction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The U.S. nuclear arsenal has steadily improved; the Russian force has sharply eroded; and Chinese nuclear modernization has progressed at a glacial pace. As a result, the United States now stands on the verge of attaining nucle…
The New Era of Counterforce
Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, “counterforce” disarming attacks—those aimed at eliminating an opponent's nuclear forces—were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around …
Protecting “The Prize”
American national security policy is based on a misunderstanding about U.S. oil interests. Although oil is a vital commodity, potential supply disruptions are less worrisome than scholars, politicians, and pundits presume. This article identifies four adaptive mechanisms that together can compensate for almost all oil shocks, meaning that continuous supply to consumers will limit scarcity-induced price increases. The adaptive mechanisms are not p…
Come Home, America
The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare
International Security - Volume 26, Number 2, Fall 2001
The effects of wars on neutral countries
Markets or Mercantilism? How China Secures Its Energy Supplies
Since oil began fueling the global economy, governments have employed policies of “energy mercantilism” to secure access to this key input. Critics of these policies claim they are unnecessary because oil can be acquired on global markets. Countries such as China that engage in energy mercantilism are thus neither enhancing their energy security nor threatening others' access to oil. These critics, however, misunderstand the logic of energy merca…
The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy
FOR ALMOST half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear states have been locked in a military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 196os, the nuclear arsenals ofthe United States and the Soviet Union had grown so large and sophisticated that neither country could entirely destroy the other's retaliatory force by launching first, even with a surprise attack. Starting a nuclear war was therefore tantamount to commi…
Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists
Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran's nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely…
Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf
The Credibility of Power
became chancellor of Germany and immediately began breaking his country’s international agreements. From 1933 to 1938 Germany violated its treaty commitments by rearming, remilitarizing the Rhineland, and seizing Austria.1 Although Britain and France complained after each German violation, they refused to respond with force. In September 1938 Hitler threatened to invade Czechoslovakia unless Germany was given a piece of Czech territory called the…
The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy
January 01 2007 The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy? Jeffrey S. Lantis, Jeffrey S. Lantis Jeffrey S. Lantis is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The College of Wooster. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Tom Sauer, Tom Sauer Tom Sauer is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Antwerp and a postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders at the Katholieke Un…
Enduring Resilience
Plentiful spare capacity persists in the oil production and tanker industries, contrary to Michael Levi's contention in his response to our earlier article, “Protecting ‘The Prize.' ” OPEC leaders retain excess capacity to minimize cartel members' cheating, and tanker companies retain considerable flexibility that allows them to adapt to political-military and other fluctuations in the market. Oil supplies are not on a knife-edge; exaggerated cla…
Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf
Come Home, America
The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare
International Security - Volume 26, Number 2, Fall 2001
The effects of wars on neutral countries
The Credibility of Power
became chancellor of Germany and immediately began breaking his country’s international agreements. From 1933 to 1938 Germany violated its treaty commitments by rearming, remilitarizing the Rhineland, and seizing Austria.1 Although Britain and France complained after each German violation, they refused to respond with force. In September 1938 Hitler threatened to invade Czechoslovakia unless Germany was given a piece of Czech territory called the…
The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy
For nearly half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear-armed states have been locked in a condition of mutual assured destruction. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically. The U.S. nuclear arsenal has steadily improved; the Russian force has sharply eroded; and Chinese nuclear modernization has progressed at a glacial pace. As a result, the United States now stands on the verge of attaining nucle…
The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy
FOR ALMOST half a century, the world's most powerful nuclear states have been locked in a military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 196os, the nuclear arsenals ofthe United States and the Soviet Union had grown so large and sophisticated that neither country could entirely destroy the other's retaliatory force by launching first, even with a surprise attack. Starting a nuclear war was therefore tantamount to commi…
The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy
January 01 2007 The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy? Jeffrey S. Lantis, Jeffrey S. Lantis Jeffrey S. Lantis is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The College of Wooster. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Tom Sauer, Tom Sauer Tom Sauer is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Antwerp and a postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders at the Katholieke Un…
Protecting “The Prize”
American national security policy is based on a misunderstanding about U.S. oil interests. Although oil is a vital commodity, potential supply disruptions are less worrisome than scholars, politicians, and pundits presume. This article identifies four adaptive mechanisms that together can compensate for almost all oil shocks, meaning that continuous supply to consumers will limit scarcity-induced price increases. The adaptive mechanisms are not p…
Enduring Resilience
Plentiful spare capacity persists in the oil production and tanker industries, contrary to Michael Levi's contention in his response to our earlier article, “Protecting ‘The Prize.' ” OPEC leaders retain excess capacity to minimize cartel members' cheating, and tanker companies retain considerable flexibility that allows them to adapt to political-military and other fluctuations in the market. Oil supplies are not on a knife-edge; exaggerated cla…
Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists
Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran's nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely…
Atomic Aversion
How strong are normative prohibitions on state behavior? We examine this question by analyzing anti-nuclear norms, sometimes called the "nuclear taboo," using an original survey experiment to evaluate American attitudes regarding nuclear use. We find that the public has only a weak aversion to using nuclear weapons and that this aversion has few characteristics of an "unthinkable" behavior or taboo. Instead, public attitudes about whether to use …
The New Era of Counterforce
Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, “counterforce” disarming attacks—those aimed at eliminating an opponent's nuclear forces—were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around …
Markets or Mercantilism? How China Secures Its Energy Supplies
Since oil began fueling the global economy, governments have employed policies of “energy mercantilism” to secure access to this key input. Critics of these policies claim they are unnecessary because oil can be acquired on global markets. Countries such as China that engage in energy mercantilism are thus neither enhancing their energy security nor threatening others' access to oil. These critics, however, misunderstand the logic of energy merca…
The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution
Leading analysts have predicted for decades that nuclear weapons would help pacify international politics. The core notion is that countries protected by these fearsome weapons can stop competing so intensely with their adversaries: they can end their arms races, scale back their alliances, and stop jockeying for strategic territory. But rarely have theory and practice been so opposed. Why do international relations in the nuclear age remain so c…
Myth of the Nuclear Revolution
US-South Korea Nuclear Sharing
Since North Korea’s first nuclear weapons test in 2006, its threat to South Korea has grown significantly. This article assesses South Korea’s changing threat environment and explores its options for strengthening deterrence. We make three key arguments. First, South Korea’s concerns about the state of deterrence on the Peninsula are well founded with growing nuclear dangers and declining credibility of the US extended deterrent. Second, leaders …
Access Denied? The Sino-American Contest for Military Primacy in Asia
How has the balance of power shifted in maritime East Asia, and what does this change mean for the U.S.-China military competition in the region? We examine these questions by focusing on a central pillar of U.S. military might—land-based air power—in the context of a war over Taiwan. We create a new, unclassified, and transparent model of a Taiwan conflict, which allows users to explore multiple scenarios, alternative U.S. basing options, variou…
Political science (16 works) · Law (13 works) · Economics (11 works) · Law (10 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (9 works) · Political economy (9 works) · Nuclear Issues and Defense (8 works) · Nuclear weapon (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works)