Daniele Condorelli
Biographic Data
| ID | 5806659 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniele Condorelli |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniele |
| FAMILY NAME | Condorelli |
| SIGNATURE | CONDORELLI D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Warwick |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2514-2438 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Data-Driven Envelopment with Privacy-Policy Tying
We present a theory of monopoly protection by means of entry in adjacent markets that have a common customer base (i.e., envelopment). A firm dominant in its market enters a data-rich secondary market and engages in predatory pricing and privacy-policy tying. We define the latter as conditioning service provision to the subscription of a privacy policy that allows bundling of user data across all sources. Acquiring data from the secondary market …
Information Design in the Holdup Problem
We analyze a bilateral trade model where the buyer chooses the distribution of her valuation for the good. The seller, after observing the buyer’s distribution but not the realized valuation, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If distributions are costless, the price and the payoffs of both the buyer and the seller are shown to be 1/e in the unique equilibrium outcome. The buyer’s equilibrium distribution generates a unit-elastic demand, and trad…
Information Design in the Holdup Problem
We analyze a bilateral trade model where the buyer chooses the distribution of her valuation for the good. The seller, after observing the buyer’s distribution but not the realized valuation, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If distributions are costless, the price and the payoffs of both the buyer and the seller are shown to be 1/e in the unique equilibrium outcome. The buyer’s equilibrium distribution generates a unit-elastic demand, and trad…
Information Design in the Holdup Problem
We analyze a bilateral trade model where the buyer chooses the distribution of her valuation for the good. The seller, after observing the buyer’s distribution but not the realized valuation, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If distributions are costless, the price and the payoffs of both the buyer and the seller are shown to be 1/e in the unique equilibrium outcome. The buyer’s equilibrium distribution generates a unit-elastic demand, and trad…
Data-Driven Envelopment with Privacy-Policy Tying
We present a theory of monopoly protection by means of entry in adjacent markets that have a common customer base (i.e., envelopment). A firm dominant in its market enters a data-rich secondary market and engages in predatory pricing and privacy-policy tying. We define the latter as conditioning service provision to the subscription of a privacy policy that allows bundling of user data across all sources. Acquiring data from the secondary market …
Economics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (1 work) · Business (1 work) · Data envelopment analysis (1 work) · Digital Platforms and Economics (1 work) · Distribution (mathematics (1 work) · Econometrics (1 work) · Economic theories and models (1 work)