Data-Driven Envelopment with Privacy-Policy Tying
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9950080 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniele Condorelli (0000-0003-2514-2438, University of Warwick, corresponding author), Jorge Padilla (0000-0002-3666-1404, Compass Lexecon , Spain) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 134 |
| Issue | 658 |
| Pages | 515-537 |
| Publication date | 2023-10-31 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/uead090 |
| OpenAlex | W4388425074 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 26 |
We present a theory of monopoly protection by means of entry in adjacent markets that have a common customer base (i.e., envelopment). A firm dominant in its market enters a data-rich secondary market and engages in predatory pricing and privacy-policy tying. We define the latter as conditioning service provision to the subscription of a privacy policy that allows bundling of user data across all sources. Acquiring data from the secondary market confers an advantage in the data-intensive primary market that shields the dominant firm from entry, thus harming consumers. We discuss potential remedies, including data unbundling and portability
Business · Data envelopment analysis · Economics · Industrial organization · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Tying · Unbundling · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Digital Platforms and Economics · ICT Impact and Policies
| Highly cited | No |
|---|