John M Vickers
Biographic Data
| ID | 5826824 |
|---|---|
| NAME | John M Vickers |
| GIVEN NAMES | John M |
| FAMILY NAME | Vickers |
| SIGNATURE | VICKERS J M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Brandeis University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1965 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Logic, Probability, and Coherence
How does deductive logic constrain probability? This question is difficult for subjectivistic approaches, according to which probability is just strength of (prudent) partial belief, for this presumes logical omniscience. This paper proposes that the way in which probability lies always between possibility and necessity can be made precise by exploiting a minor theorem of de Finetti: In any finite set of propositions the expected number of truths…
I Believe It, But Soon I'll Not Believe It Any More
Chance and Structure
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Chance and Structure. By John M. Vickers. (Oxford: Garendon Press, 1989. Pp viii + 244. Price £27.50.) David Miller David Miller University of Warwick Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 158, January 1990, Pages 103–106, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219972 Published: 01 January 1990
Définition et métalangage
Belief and Probability
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Belief and Probability. By John M. Vickers. (Dordrecht & Boston: Reidel. 1976. Pp. viii + 202.) J. P. Day J. P. Day Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 28, Issue 111, April 1978, Pages 171–172, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219365 Published: 01 April 1978
Some Remarks on Coherence and Subjective Probability
The interpretation of the calculus of probability as a logic of partial belief has at least two advantages: it makes the assignment of probabilities plausible in cases where classical frequentist interpretations must find such assignments meaningless, and it gives a clear meaning to partial belief and to consistency of partial belief
I Believe It, But Soon I'll Not Believe It Any More
Some Remarks on Coherence and Subjective Probability
The interpretation of the calculus of probability as a logic of partial belief has at least two advantages: it makes the assignment of probabilities plausible in cases where classical frequentist interpretations must find such assignments meaningless, and it gives a clear meaning to partial belief and to consistency of partial belief
Some Remarks on Coherence and Subjective Probability
The interpretation of the calculus of probability as a logic of partial belief has at least two advantages: it makes the assignment of probabilities plausible in cases where classical frequentist interpretations must find such assignments meaningless, and it gives a clear meaning to partial belief and to consistency of partial belief
Belief and Probability
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Belief and Probability. By John M. Vickers. (Dordrecht & Boston: Reidel. 1976. Pp. viii + 202.) J. P. Day J. P. Day Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 28, Issue 111, April 1978, Pages 171–172, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219365 Published: 01 April 1978
Définition et métalangage
Chance and Structure
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Chance and Structure. By John M. Vickers. (Oxford: Garendon Press, 1989. Pp viii + 244. Price £27.50.) David Miller David Miller University of Warwick Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 158, January 1990, Pages 103–106, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219972 Published: 01 January 1990
I Believe It, But Soon I'll Not Believe It Any More
Logic, Probability, and Coherence
How does deductive logic constrain probability? This question is difficult for subjectivistic approaches, according to which probability is just strength of (prudent) partial belief, for this presumes logical omniscience. This paper proposes that the way in which probability lies always between possibility and necessity can be made precise by exploiting a minor theorem of de Finetti: In any finite set of propositions the expected number of truths…
Philosophy (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) (2 works) · Discrete mathematics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Advanced Text Analysis Techniques (1 work) · Art (1 work)