Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Logic, Probability, and Coherence

Bibliographic Data

ID10707377
AuthorsJohn M Vickers (Claremont Graduate University, corresponding author)
Year2001
Volume68
Issue1
Pages95-110
Publication date2001-03-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/392868
OpenAlexW2044057511
LanguageEN
References cited15

How does deductive logic constrain probability? This question is difficult for subjectivistic approaches, according to which probability is just strength of (prudent) partial belief, for this presumes logical omniscience. This paper proposes that the way in which probability lies always between possibility and necessity can be made precise by exploiting a minor theorem of de Finetti: In any finite set of propositions the expected number of truths is the sum of the probabilities over the set. This is generalized to apply to denumerable languages. It entails that the sum of probabilities can neither exceed nor be exceeded by the cardinalities of all consistent and closed (within the set) subsets. In general any numerical function on sentences is said to be logically coherent if it satisfies this condition. Logical coherence allows the relativization of necessity: A function p on a language is coherent with respect to the concept T of necessity iff there is no set of sentences on which the sum of p exceeds or is exceeded by the cardinality of every T-consistent and T-closed (within the set) subset of the set. Coherence is easily applied as well to sets on which the sum of p does not converge. Probability should also be relativized by necessity: A T-probability assigns one to every T-necessary sentence and is additive over disjunctions of pairwise T-incompatible sentences. Logical T-coherence is then equivalent to T-probability: All and only T-coherent functions are T-probabilities

Cardinality (data modeling) · Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) · Discrete mathematics · Finite set · Function (biology) · Imprecise probability · Probability measure · Set (abstract data type) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy and History of Science

  • Pragmatics and Empiricism

    Brian Skyrms•Pragmatics and Empiricism•1984

  • Probability and the Art of Judgment

    Open Access•Richard C Jeffrey, Richard Jeffrey•Probability and the Art of Judgment•1992

  • Betting on Theories

    Open Access•Patrick Maher•Betting on Theories•1993

  • Radical Interpretation

    Open Access•Donald Davidson•dialectica•1973

  • Depragmatized Dutch Book Arguments

    Open Access•Patrick Maher•Philosophy of Science•1997

  • A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism

    Open Access•James M Joyce•Philosophy of Science•1998

  • Bayes and Beyond

    Open Access•Geoffrey Hellman•Philosophy of Science•1997

  • The Theory of Probability

    Donald C Williams, Hans Reichenbach et al.•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1950

  • Theories of Probability

    Colin Howson•The British Journal for the…•1995

Highly citedNo

Tools

Open DOI
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae