Md Muhibbur Rahman
Biographic Data
| ID | 5843336 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Md Muhibbur Rahman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Md Muhibbur |
| FAMILY NAME | Rahman |
| SIGNATURE | RAHMAN M M |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Texas at Austin |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7718-6961 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Border Barriers and Local Armed Conflicts
How do physical border barriers affect armed conflicts in builder states? The recent upsurge in border fortifications warrants a closer look at this question. The paper argues that border barriers make builder states less likely to experience a domestic armed conflict. They weaken cross-border support networks that bolster rebels’ ability to challenge governments militarily. They do so by limiting rebels’ access to foreign support such as arms, t…
Institutionalized Defense Cooperation and Regime Security
How does the institutionalization of external security cooperation affect government-military relations? This question has become increasingly salient amid a dramatic increase in bilateral defense cooperation agreements over the past few decades. I argue that DCAs help stabilize government-military relations and bolster regime security by mitigating a persistent credibility problem between signatory governments and their armed forces. By securing…
Military Insubordination and International Coercion
Do acts of military insubordination affect foreign aggression? We argue that mutiny makes a state more vulnerable to international coercion. Mutinies help foreign adversaries differentiate weak targets from strong ones by “affecting” and “revealing” states’ war-fighting costs and resolve. They disrupt the military command structure, thereby increasing the costs of organizing a well-coordinated defense against foreign threats. They also make deter…
The Political Economy of Peacekeeping: Civil–Military Resource Substitution through International Brokerage
What effects does participation in peacekeeping operations (PKO) have on the participating countries’ civil–military resource allocation? Answering this question can widen our understanding of state motivations to contribute to the United Nations PKOs by incorporating the civil–military dynamic. We argue that contributing states can substitute part of their domestic military expenditures with external resources. Governments act as brokers between…
Military in the cabinet and defense spending of civilian governments
In this article, we assess the variation in civilian governments’ defense spending as a function of civil-military relations. We present a novel explanation based on the military’s presence in the political decision-making apparatus. We argue that the appointment of an active military officer in a key governmental position allows the government to make a more credible commitment to provide the military with adequate rents and thereby stabilizes c…
Military in the cabinet and defense spending of civilian governments
In this article, we assess the variation in civilian governments’ defense spending as a function of civil-military relations. We present a novel explanation based on the military’s presence in the political decision-making apparatus. We argue that the appointment of an active military officer in a key governmental position allows the government to make a more credible commitment to provide the military with adequate rents and thereby stabilizes c…
The Political Economy of Peacekeeping: Civil–Military Resource Substitution through International Brokerage
What effects does participation in peacekeeping operations (PKO) have on the participating countries’ civil–military resource allocation? Answering this question can widen our understanding of state motivations to contribute to the United Nations PKOs by incorporating the civil–military dynamic. We argue that contributing states can substitute part of their domestic military expenditures with external resources. Governments act as brokers between…
Military in the cabinet and defense spending of civilian governments
In this article, we assess the variation in civilian governments’ defense spending as a function of civil-military relations. We present a novel explanation based on the military’s presence in the political decision-making apparatus. We argue that the appointment of an active military officer in a key governmental position allows the government to make a more credible commitment to provide the military with adequate rents and thereby stabilizes c…
Military Insubordination and International Coercion
Do acts of military insubordination affect foreign aggression? We argue that mutiny makes a state more vulnerable to international coercion. Mutinies help foreign adversaries differentiate weak targets from strong ones by “affecting” and “revealing” states’ war-fighting costs and resolve. They disrupt the military command structure, thereby increasing the costs of organizing a well-coordinated defense against foreign threats. They also make deter…
Border Barriers and Local Armed Conflicts
How do physical border barriers affect armed conflicts in builder states? The recent upsurge in border fortifications warrants a closer look at this question. The paper argues that border barriers make builder states less likely to experience a domestic armed conflict. They weaken cross-border support networks that bolster rebels’ ability to challenge governments militarily. They do so by limiting rebels’ access to foreign support such as arms, t…
Institutionalized Defense Cooperation and Regime Security
How does the institutionalization of external security cooperation affect government-military relations? This question has become increasingly salient amid a dramatic increase in bilateral defense cooperation agreements over the past few decades. I argue that DCAs help stabilize government-military relations and bolster regime security by mitigating a persistent credibility problem between signatory governments and their armed forces. By securing…
Politics (4 works) · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies (3 works) · Peacebuilding and International Security (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Government (linguistics (2 works) · International relations (2 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Public Administration (2 works)