Military Insubordination and International Coercion

Bibliographic Data

ID10071725
AuthorsMd Muhibbur Rahman (0000-0002-7718-6961, University of Pennsylvania, corresponding author), N Sakib (0000-0003-4930-2862, University of Kentucky)
Year2025
Volume70
Issue7-8
Pages1183-1213
Publication date2025-12-26
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/00220027251410091
OpenAlexW7117305646
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited55

Do acts of military insubordination affect foreign aggression? We argue that mutiny makes a state more vulnerable to international coercion. Mutinies help foreign adversaries differentiate weak targets from strong ones by “affecting” and “revealing” states’ war-fighting costs and resolve. They disrupt the military command structure, thereby increasing the costs of organizing a well-coordinated defense against foreign threats. They also make deterrence posturing less effective by signaling a weakened resolve that sets the stage for the mutiny. Using time-series-cross-sectional data from 1945 to 2014, we show that mutiny (a) increases the likelihood of the state being targeted in a militarized interstate dispute, and (b) decreases the likelihood of its resistance once the MID is initiated. The paper advances our understanding of how civil-military relations affect states’ external threat environment. It also underscores the dynamic role of private information in international conflict processes

Affect (linguistics · Coercion (linguistics · Deterrence theory · Foreign policy · International conflict · International relations · Mutiny · State (computer science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · International Relations and Foreign Policy

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