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Vikrant Vig

Biographic Data

ID5850607
NAMEVikrant Vig
GIVEN NAMESVikrant
FAMILY NAMEVig
SIGNATUREVIG V
AFFILIATIONSLondon Business School
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS53
WORKS AS AUTHOR4
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2011
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2020
H-INDEX3
  • Experience of Communal Conflicts and Intergroup Lending

    Raymond Fisman, Arkodipta Sarkar et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2020•Cited by: 3•References: 5

    We provide microeconomic evidence on ethnic frictions and market efficiency, using dyadic data on managers and borrowers from a large Indian bank. We conjecture that, if exposure to religion-based communal violence intensifies intergroup animosity, riot exposure will lead to lending decisions that are more sensitive to a borrower’s religion. We find that riot-exposed Hindu branch managers lend relatively less to Muslim borrowers and that these lo…

  • Rent Seeking in Elite Networks

    Rainer Haselmann, David Schoenherr et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2018•Cited by: 6•References: 12

    We employ a unique data set on members of an elite service club in Germany to investigate how social connections in elite networks affect the allocation of resources. Specifically, we investigate credit allocation decisions of banks to firms inside the network. Using a quasi-experimental research design, we document misallocation of bank credit inside the network, with bankers with weakly aligned incentives engaging most actively in crony lending…

  • The Private Returns to Public Office

    Raymond Fisman, F Schulz et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2014•Cited by: 44•References: 1

    We study the wealth accumulation of Indian state politicians using public disclosures required of all candidates. The annual asset growth of winners is 3–5 percent higher than that of runners-up, a difference that holds also in a set of close elections. The relative asset growth of winners is greater in more corrupt states and for those holding ministerial positions. These results are consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for the relatively …

  • The Unintended Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

    Vidhi Chhaochharia, Clemens A Otto et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2011

    The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in the wake of several scandals that rocked corporate America in 2001 and 2002. The objective behind SOX was to improve corporate governance by improving accounting disclosures. Compliance with Section 404 is considered by many to be the most costly requirement of SOX and has been argued to be a disproportionate burden for small firms. Consequently, firms with a public float below $75 million were granted s…

  • The Private Returns to Public Office

    Raymond Fisman, F Schulz et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2014•Cited by: 44•References: 1

    We study the wealth accumulation of Indian state politicians using public disclosures required of all candidates. The annual asset growth of winners is 3–5 percent higher than that of runners-up, a difference that holds also in a set of close elections. The relative asset growth of winners is greater in more corrupt states and for those holding ministerial positions. These results are consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for the relatively …

  • Rent Seeking in Elite Networks

    Rainer Haselmann, David Schoenherr et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2018•Cited by: 6•References: 12

    We employ a unique data set on members of an elite service club in Germany to investigate how social connections in elite networks affect the allocation of resources. Specifically, we investigate credit allocation decisions of banks to firms inside the network. Using a quasi-experimental research design, we document misallocation of bank credit inside the network, with bankers with weakly aligned incentives engaging most actively in crony lending…

  • Experience of Communal Conflicts and Intergroup Lending

    Raymond Fisman, Arkodipta Sarkar et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2020•Cited by: 3•References: 5

    We provide microeconomic evidence on ethnic frictions and market efficiency, using dyadic data on managers and borrowers from a large Indian bank. We conjecture that, if exposure to religion-based communal violence intensifies intergroup animosity, riot exposure will lead to lending decisions that are more sensitive to a borrower’s religion. We find that riot-exposed Hindu branch managers lend relatively less to Muslim borrowers and that these lo…

  • The Unintended Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

    Vidhi Chhaochharia, Clemens A Otto et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Institutional and…•2011

    The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in the wake of several scandals that rocked corporate America in 2001 and 2002. The objective behind SOX was to improve corporate governance by improving accounting disclosures. Compliance with Section 404 is considered by many to be the most costly requirement of SOX and has been argued to be a disproportionate burden for small firms. Consequently, firms with a public float below $75 million were granted s…

  • The Private Returns to Public Office

    Raymond Fisman, F Schulz et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2014•Cited by: 44•References: 1

    We study the wealth accumulation of Indian state politicians using public disclosures required of all candidates. The annual asset growth of winners is 3–5 percent higher than that of runners-up, a difference that holds also in a set of close elections. The relative asset growth of winners is greater in more corrupt states and for those holding ministerial positions. These results are consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for the relatively …

  • Rent Seeking in Elite Networks

    Rainer Haselmann, David Schoenherr et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2018•Cited by: 6•References: 12

    We employ a unique data set on members of an elite service club in Germany to investigate how social connections in elite networks affect the allocation of resources. Specifically, we investigate credit allocation decisions of banks to firms inside the network. Using a quasi-experimental research design, we document misallocation of bank credit inside the network, with bankers with weakly aligned incentives engaging most actively in crony lending…

  • Experience of Communal Conflicts and Intergroup Lending

    Raymond Fisman, Arkodipta Sarkar et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2020•Cited by: 3•References: 5

    We provide microeconomic evidence on ethnic frictions and market efficiency, using dyadic data on managers and borrowers from a large Indian bank. We conjecture that, if exposure to religion-based communal violence intensifies intergroup animosity, riot exposure will lead to lending decisions that are more sensitive to a borrower’s religion. We find that riot-exposed Hindu branch managers lend relatively less to Muslim borrowers and that these lo…

Political science (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Rent-seeking (2 works) · Set (abstract data type (2 works) · Accounting (1 work) · Asset (computer security (1 work)

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