Rent Seeking in Elite Networks
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10177879 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rainer Haselmann (Goethe University Frankfurt), David Schoenherr (Princeton University), Vikrant Vig (Centre for Economic Policy Research) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 126 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1638-1690 |
| Publication date | 2018-03-16 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/697742 |
| OpenAlex | W2370055211 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 37 |
We employ a unique data set on members of an elite service club in Germany to investigate how social connections in elite networks affect the allocation of resources. Specifically, we investigate credit allocation decisions of banks to firms inside the network. Using a quasi-experimental research design, we document misallocation of bank credit inside the network, with bankers with weakly aligned incentives engaging most actively in crony lending. Our findings, thus, resonate with existing theories of elite networks as rent extractive coalitions that stifle economic prosperity
Business · Club · Economic growth · Economics · Economy · Elite · Incentive · Microeconomics · Political science · Prosperity · Rent-seeking · Service (business · Set (abstract data type · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Computer Science · Corporate Finance and Governance · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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Two notions of social capital
The emergence of the ‘rentocrat’
Political connections and misallocation of procurement contracts
How public information affects asymmetrically informed lenders
Discrimination, Managers, and Firm Performance
Losing My Connection
Municipally Owned Enterprises as Danger Zones for Corruption? How Politicians Having Feet in Two Camps May Undermine Conditions for Accountability
The General Theory of Second Best
The effects of government ownership on bank lending
Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
Trust and Social Collateral
Moral Hazard in Teams
Bowling alone
The Economics of Discrimination
The Rise and Decline of Nations
Discrimination in Labor Markets
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
Corruption
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns
Branch Banking as a Device for Discipline
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Market Structure and Productivity
Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation
The Soft Budget Constraint
The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes
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| Citations per year | 1.14 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2019 - 2025 (7) |
| Highly cited | No |