Leslie M Marx
Biographic Data
| ID | 5853517 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Leslie M Marx |
| GIVEN NAMES | Leslie M |
| FAMILY NAME | Marx |
| SIGNATURE | MARX L M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Duke University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4063-8733 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Efficient Consignment Auctions
Consignment auctions are two-stage mechanisms to (re)allocate emission permits. Firms are first endowed with permits and then allowed to trade them. We determine theoretically endowments that enable efficient allocation, subject to incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and no deficit. All firms prefer efficient consignment auctions to efficient standard auctions, making them politically palatable. Firms’ investment incentives align wit…
Price Coordination with Asymmetric Information Sharing
Platform-based information sharing among competing firms presents challenges for antitrust authorities, yet effective remedies remain unclear. Drawing inspiration from the Informed Sources retail gasoline antitrust case, we develop a theoretical model that offers policy guidance for disrupting anticompetitive coordination facilitated through price-sharing platforms. Removing only one firm from a platform may be ineffective for disrupting such coo…
Merger Review for Markets with Buyer Power
We analyze the competitive effects of mergers in markets with buyer power. Using mechanism design arguments, we show that without cost synergies, mergers harm buyers, regardless of buyer power. However, buyer power mitigates the harm to a buyer from a merger of symmetric suppliers. With buyer power, a merger increases incentives for entry, increases investment incentives for rivals, and can increase investment incentives for merging parties. Beca…
The Economics of Collusion
An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a s…
Economics of Collusion
Adverse Specialization
We analyze a multiple-activity, principal-agent model in which the activities are naturally substitutable for the agent and complementary for the principal. A basic result is that the optimal compensation must cause the agent to view the activities as complements. This complementarity is achieved by employing a compensation scheme that is typically nonmonotone and makes success on multiple dimensions the sole source of large rewards. A number of …
Algumas características do setor privado de saúde de Salvador, Bahia, Brasil
Com o objetivo de descrever algumas características dos serviços de saúde privados do Município de Salvador, foi realizado inquérito envolvendo 174 estabelecimentos cadastrados no IBGE. Foram investigados a natureza jurídica, a capacidade instalada ambulatorial e hospitalar, a produção e o custo das consultas médicas segundo modalidades de financiamento público e privado. As diferentes formas de assistência médica supletiva são a principal fonte …
Adverse Specialization
We analyze a multiple-activity, principal-agent model in which the activities are naturally substitutable for the agent and complementary for the principal. A basic result is that the optimal compensation must cause the agent to view the activities as complements. This complementarity is achieved by employing a compensation scheme that is typically nonmonotone and makes success on multiple dimensions the sole source of large rewards. A number of …
Algumas características do setor privado de saúde de Salvador, Bahia, Brasil
Com o objetivo de descrever algumas características dos serviços de saúde privados do Município de Salvador, foi realizado inquérito envolvendo 174 estabelecimentos cadastrados no IBGE. Foram investigados a natureza jurídica, a capacidade instalada ambulatorial e hospitalar, a produção e o custo das consultas médicas segundo modalidades de financiamento público e privado. As diferentes formas de assistência médica supletiva são a principal fonte …
Algumas características do setor privado de saúde de Salvador, Bahia, Brasil
Com o objetivo de descrever algumas características dos serviços de saúde privados do Município de Salvador, foi realizado inquérito envolvendo 174 estabelecimentos cadastrados no IBGE. Foram investigados a natureza jurídica, a capacidade instalada ambulatorial e hospitalar, a produção e o custo das consultas médicas segundo modalidades de financiamento público e privado. As diferentes formas de assistência médica supletiva são a principal fonte …
Adverse Specialization
We analyze a multiple-activity, principal-agent model in which the activities are naturally substitutable for the agent and complementary for the principal. A basic result is that the optimal compensation must cause the agent to view the activities as complements. This complementarity is achieved by employing a compensation scheme that is typically nonmonotone and makes success on multiple dimensions the sole source of large rewards. A number of …
The Economics of Collusion
An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a s…
Economics of Collusion
Merger Review for Markets with Buyer Power
We analyze the competitive effects of mergers in markets with buyer power. Using mechanism design arguments, we show that without cost synergies, mergers harm buyers, regardless of buyer power. However, buyer power mitigates the harm to a buyer from a merger of symmetric suppliers. With buyer power, a merger increases incentives for entry, increases investment incentives for rivals, and can increase investment incentives for merging parties. Beca…
Price Coordination with Asymmetric Information Sharing
Platform-based information sharing among competing firms presents challenges for antitrust authorities, yet effective remedies remain unclear. Drawing inspiration from the Informed Sources retail gasoline antitrust case, we develop a theoretical model that offers policy guidance for disrupting anticompetitive coordination facilitated through price-sharing platforms. Removing only one firm from a platform may be ineffective for disrupting such coo…
Efficient Consignment Auctions
Consignment auctions are two-stage mechanisms to (re)allocate emission permits. Firms are first endowed with permits and then allowed to trade them. We determine theoretically endowments that enable efficient allocation, subject to incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and no deficit. All firms prefer efficient consignment auctions to efficient standard auctions, making them politically palatable. Firms’ investment incentives align wit…
Economics (5 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Collusion (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Industrial organization (2 works)