Price Coordination with Asymmetric Information Sharing
Theory and Evidence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19315656 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Byrne (0000-0003-3885-6915, The University of Melbourne), David P Byrne (Department of Economics, University of Melbourne [email protected]), Nicolas de Roos (0000-0002-1203-6268, School of Management, University of Liverpool [email protected]), Matthew S Lewis (0000-0002-2211-6595, John E. Walker Department of Economics, Clemson University [email protected]), Leslie M Marx (0000-0002-4063-8733, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University [email protected]), Xiaosong Wu (0000-0002-6164-7305, Department of Economics, University of Melbourne [email protected]) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Pages | 1-45 |
| Publication date | 2025-12-18 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Review of Economics and Statistics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-6535 • E-ISSN: 1530-9142 |
| Publisher | MIT Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1162/rest.a.1691 |
| OpenAlex | W4417516640 |
| Language | EN |
Platform-based information sharing among competing firms presents challenges for antitrust authorities, yet effective remedies remain unclear. Drawing inspiration from the Informed Sources retail gasoline antitrust case, we develop a theoretical model that offers policy guidance for disrupting anticompetitive coordination facilitated through price-sharing platforms. Removing only one firm from a platform may be ineffective for disrupting such coordination. However, competitive benefits can emerge if (i) at least two firms lack platform access, and (ii) the costs of price leadership are sufficiently high. More broadly, coordinating price increases becomes more difficult when multiple firms cannot quickly observe or respond to rivals' prices
Complete information · Information asymmetry · Information economics · Information sharing · Vertical restraints · Digital Platforms and Economics · ICT Impact and Policies · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Highly cited | No |
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