Jeffrey C Ely
Biographic Data
| ID | 5867376 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jeffrey C Ely |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jeffrey C |
| FAMILY NAME | Ely |
| SIGNATURE | ELY J C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Northwestern University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 24 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Moving the Goalposts
We study information as an incentive device in a dynamic moral hazard framework. An agent works on a task of uncertain difficulty, modeled as the duration of required effort. The principal knows the task difficulty and provides information over time. The optimal mechanism features moving goalposts: an initial disclosure makes the agent sufficiently optimistic that the task is easy. If the task is indeed difficult, the agent is told this only afte…
Do agents maximise? Risk taking on first and second serves in tennis
Suspense and Surprise
We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period’s beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period’s belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise exper…
Suspense and Surprise
We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period’s beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period’s belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise exper…
Do agents maximise? Risk taking on first and second serves in tennis
Moving the Goalposts
We study information as an incentive device in a dynamic moral hazard framework. An agent works on a task of uncertain difficulty, modeled as the duration of required effort. The principal knows the task difficulty and provides information over time. The optimal mechanism features moving goalposts: an initial disclosure makes the agent sufficiently optimistic that the task is easy. If the task is indeed difficult, the agent is told this only afte…
Suspense and Surprise
We model demand for noninstrumental information, drawing on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period has more suspense if the variance of the next period’s beliefs is greater. A period has more surprise if the current belief is further from the last period’s belief. Under these definitions, we analyze the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise exper…
Do agents maximise? Risk taking on first and second serves in tennis
Moving the Goalposts
We study information as an incentive device in a dynamic moral hazard framework. An agent works on a task of uncertain difficulty, modeled as the duration of required effort. The principal knows the task difficulty and provides information over time. The optimal mechanism features moving goalposts: an initial disclosure makes the agent sufficiently optimistic that the task is easy. If the task is indeed difficult, the agent is told this only afte…
Economics (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Advertising (2 works) · Business (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 works) · Aesthetics (1 works)