Moving the Goalposts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10183706 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeffrey C Ely, Martin Szydlowski (0000-0002-4212-9545, University of Minnesota System) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 128 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 468-506 |
| Publication date | 2019-05-14 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/704387 |
| OpenAlex | W2946784472 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 16 |
We study information as an incentive device in a dynamic moral hazard framework. An agent works on a task of uncertain difficulty, modeled as the duration of required effort. The principal knows the task difficulty and provides information over time. The optimal mechanism features moving goalposts: an initial disclosure makes the agent sufficiently optimistic that the task is easy. If the task is indeed difficult, the agent is told this only after working long enough to put the difficult task within reach. The agent then completes the difficult task even though he never would have chosen to at the outset. © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved
Cognitive psychology · Computer security · Economics · Epistemology · Incentive · Mechanism (biology · Microeconomics · Moral hazard · Principal (computer security · Task (project management · Computer Science · Economic Theory and Institutions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,75 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |