Keeping the Listener Engaged
A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10175294 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yeon‐Koo Che (0000-0002-8985-2554, Columbia University), Yeon-Koo Che, Kyungmin Kim (0000-0002-7382-4882, Emory University), Konrad Mierendorff (University College London) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 131 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 1797-1844 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-10 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3808 • E-ISSN: 1537-534X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/722985 |
| OpenAlex | W4308886374 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 23 |
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow's sender-optimal persuasion as well as full revelation and everything in between are obtained in Markov perfect equilibrium as the cost vanishes
Bayesian game · Bayesian probability · Commit · Communication source · Economics · Equilibrium selection · Game theory · Machine learning · Markov chain · Markov perfect equilibrium · Markov process · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Persuasion · Repeated game · Sequential equilibrium · Sequential game · Statistics · Artificial Intelligence · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |