Yeon-Koo Che

Biographic Data

ID5867910
NAMEYeon-Koo Che
GIVEN NAMESYeon-Koo
FAMILY NAMEChe
SIGNATURECHE Y
AFFILIATIONSDepartment of Economics; Columbia University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS7
TOTAL CITATIONS15
AUTHOR COUNT7
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1997
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2022
H-INDEX1

  • Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion

    Yeon‐Koo Che, Yeon-Koo Che et al.ARTICLEJournal of Political Economy2022Cited by: 1

    We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow's sender-optimal persuasion…

  • Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets: Payoff equivalence in matching markets

    Open AccessYeon‐Koo Che, Yeon-Koo Che et al.ARTICLETheoretical Economics2018

    We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic shocks. We provide a broad set of circumstances under which, as the market grows large, all Pareto efficient mechanisms—including top trading cycles (with an arbitrary ownership structure), serial dictatorship (with an arbitrary serial or…

  • Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets

    Yeon‐Koo Che, Yeon-Koo Che et al.ARTICLEJournal of Political Economy2018Cited by: 1References: 4

    We study efficient and stable mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individuals’ preferences and priorities are drawn randomly. When agents’ preferences are uncorrelated, then both efficiency and stability can be achieved in an asymptotic sense via standard mechanisms such as deferred acceptance and top trading cycles. When agents’ preferences are correlated over objects, however, these mechanisms are either ineffi…

  • Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp

    Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Yeon‐Koo Che et al.REPORTNational Bureau of Economic…2017

    In 2012, New Orleans Recovery School District (RSD) became the first U.S. district to unify charter and traditional public school admissions in a single-offer assignment mechanism known as OneApp. The RSD also became the first district to use a mechanism based on Top Trading Cycles (TTC) in a real-life allocation problem. Since TTC was originally devised for settings in which agents have endowments, there is no formal rationale for TTC in school …

  • Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer

    Yeon‐Koo Che, Yeon-Koo Che et al.ARTICLEJournal of Institutional and…2008

    This paper considers settlement negotiations between a single defendant and N plaintiffs when there are fixed costs of litigation. When making simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to the plaintiffs, the defendant adopts a divide-and-conquer strategy. Plaintiffs settle their claims for less than they are jointly worth. The problem is worse when N is larger, the offers are sequential, and the plaintiffs make offers instead. Although divide-and-c…

  • Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure

    Yeon‐Koo Che, Yeon-Koo CheARTICLEJournal of Institutional and…2008

    »Vielmehr bietet [der Kommentar] auf höchstem Niveau eine substantielle Auseinandersetzung mit den Hintergründen, den Zusammenhängen, der Theorie und der Praxis des Grundgesetzes. Besseres lässt sich von einem Verfassungskommentar nicht sagen.“ Herbert Günther Staaatsanzeiger für das Land Hessen 2018 (50), 1494–1495

  • Rent dissipation when rent seekers are budget constrained

    Open AccessYeon‐Koo Che, Yeon-Koo Che et al.ARTICLEPublic Choice1997Cited by: 13References: 11