Konrad Mierendorff
Biographic Data
| ID | 5868087 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Konrad Mierendorff |
| GIVEN NAMES | Konrad |
| FAMILY NAME | Mierendorff |
| SIGNATURE | MIERENDORFF K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University College London |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Auction design with data‐driven misspecifications: Inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation
We study the existence of efficient auctions in private value settings in which some bidders form their expectations about the distribution of their competitor's bids based on the accessible data from past similar auctions consisting of bids and ex post values. We consider steady states in such environments with a mix of rational and data‐driven bidders, and we allow for correlation across bidders in the signal distributions about the ex post val…
Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow's sender-optimal persuasion…
Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow's sender-optimal persuasion…
Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow's sender-optimal persuasion…
Auction design with data‐driven misspecifications: Inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation
We study the existence of efficient auctions in private value settings in which some bidders form their expectations about the distribution of their competitor's bids based on the accessible data from past similar auctions consisting of bids and ex post values. We consider steady states in such environments with a mix of rational and data‐driven bidders, and we allow for correlation across bidders in the signal distributions about the ex post val…
Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Statistics (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Bayesian game (1 works) · Bayesian probability (1 works) · Commit (1 works)