Mihai Manea
Biographic Data
| ID | 5867401 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mihai Manea |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mihai |
| FAMILY NAME | Manea |
| SIGNATURE | MANEA M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stanford University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Efficient partnership formation in networks
We analyze the formation of partnerships in social networks. Players need favors at random times and ask their neighbors in the network to form exclusive long‐term partnerships that guarantee reciprocal favor exchange. Refusing to provide a favor results in the automatic removal of the underlying link. Players agree to provide the first favor in a partnership only if they otherwise face the risk of eventual isolation. In equilibrium, players esse…
Intermediation and Resale in Networks
I study intermediation via sequential bilateral bargaining in markets with a network structure. A partition of the network into layers captures intermediation power. Competition governs trade within layers, and hold-ups generate intermediation rents in transactions between layers. Each trader’s intermediation power reflects the competition among intermediation chains as measured by the number of layers separating the trader from buyers. Trade doe…
Intermediation and Resale in Networks
I study intermediation via sequential bilateral bargaining in markets with a network structure. A partition of the network into layers captures intermediation power. Competition governs trade within layers, and hold-ups generate intermediation rents in transactions between layers. Each trader’s intermediation power reflects the competition among intermediation chains as measured by the number of layers separating the trader from buyers. Trade doe…
Intermediation and Resale in Networks
I study intermediation via sequential bilateral bargaining in markets with a network structure. A partition of the network into layers captures intermediation power. Competition governs trade within layers, and hold-ups generate intermediation rents in transactions between layers. Each trader’s intermediation power reflects the competition among intermediation chains as measured by the number of layers separating the trader from buyers. Trade doe…
Efficient partnership formation in networks
We analyze the formation of partnerships in social networks. Players need favors at random times and ask their neighbors in the network to form exclusive long‐term partnerships that guarantee reciprocal favor exchange. Refusing to provide a favor results in the automatic removal of the underlying link. Players agree to provide the first favor in a partnership only if they otherwise face the risk of eventual isolation. In equilibrium, players esse…
Business (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Bargaining power (1 work) · Competition (biology (1 work) · Digital Platforms and Economics (1 work) · Downstream (manufacturing (1 work) · Economic rent (1 work) · Economic theories and models (1 work)